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Issue 2, March/April 2007
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Regional Lending in a World
of Interstate Banking
By Kenneth J. Robinson
Texans today can obtain banking
services from an institution based in Muleshoe or from
one headquartered as far away as New York City. But
this wasn’t always possible. Federal law once
prohibited most banks from branching across state lines.
It wasn’t until Congress passed the Riegle–Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
that institutions and their customers could enjoy the
full benefits of interstate banking (see “Banks
vs. Branches").[1]
Unfortunately, the same legislation
that increased the U.S. banking system’s efficiency
also muddied the regional lending picture. In Texas,
official data on loan volume—which represents
the activity of institutions headquartered in the state—was
skewed when many Texas-based banks became branches of
banks based elsewhere.
Loan growth at Texas banks has
been erratic since the late 1990s, giving the illusion
of an industry in flux. But when the data are adjusted
for interstate branching, a more positive growth pattern
emerges.
Lending trends are closely watched
because they provide insights into economic activity.
Growth and employment reflect capital flows that go
to businesses to fund operations and to consumers to
buy houses, cars and other durables. If the data don’t
capture loan activity from outside the state, we can’t
get a clear picture of the Texas economy.
Measuring Loan Activity
The inflation-adjusted stock
of total loans and business loans at Texas banks experienced
a sharp run-up in year-over-year growth in the late
1970s and early 1980s, corresponding to the state’s
oil boom (Chart 1).[2]

The sustained lending decline
that followed reflects the collapse in oil prices and
the regional recession beginning in the mid-1980s. Lending
bounced back as the economy recovered in the early 1990s.
Despite a booming economy, loan activity became highly
erratic in the late 1990s.
Banks that have only branches
in Texas aren’t required to report their lending
in the state. Major players such as NationsBank of Texas,
Bank One, Texas and Wells Fargo Bank Texas fell out
of state data in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when
they converted their operations to branches (Table
1). This resulted in a misleading picture of state
loan activity.

As banks became branches, Texas
experienced negative loan growth in percentage terms.
However, the downward spikes are an accounting artifact.
When accounting changes due to branching are not allowed
to affect lending growth rates, the spikes disappear
and the lending series display a more regular pattern
(Chart 2).[3]

Data on small-business loans also
point to a more stable lending environment during the
interstate branching period.
Under
the Community Reinvestment Act, some banks are required
to report the location of their small business lending.
From 1996 through 2004, institutions with assets of
$250 million and higher reported the geographic distribution
of loan originations to businesses with gross annual
revenues of $1 million or less. Beginning in 2005, only
banks with assets of $1 billion or more were required
to report this information.[4]
While not a complete picture of
activity in Texas, these data reveal that until 2005,
when smaller institutions dropped out of the sample,
the dollar amount of loan originations for both Texas-based
and out-of-state banks generally rose (Chart 3).
Assessing Economic Impact
Do important inflation-adjusted
measures of lending growth at Texas banks—total
loans and business loans—correlate with Texas
economic activity?
Before interstate branching, loan
growth tended to move in tandem with regional economic
activity. The volatile, unadjusted lending data don’t
track as closely with economic activity in Texas after
branching arrived in 1998. When the data are adjusted
for interstate branching, however, some fairly strong
correlations appear.
Correlation coefficients, which
measure the extent to which two series move together,
provide a straightforward method of determining what
regional lending patterns might reveal about the economy.
A coefficient of 100 percent means the series move in
an identical fashion. A coefficient of zero indicates
no relationship between the series. If the coefficient
is negative, the series move in opposite directions.[5]
In Table 2, correlation coefficients
are calculated for lending activity and year-over-year
growth in gross state product, employment growth and
changes in the Texas Business-Cycle Index. The first
period covers the pre-interstate branching era in Texas,
from 1977 to 1997. The second period begins with the
introduction of branching in 1998 and runs through 2006.
Two sets of correlations are given for this latter time
frame. One shows the correlation coefficients using
data unadjusted for interstate branching; the other
uses the adjusted data series.

In the period before interstate
branching, the correlations are generally higher for
business loans than total loans, as expected, and range
from 36 percent to 48 percent. After branching is allowed
in Texas, the correlation coefficients using unadjusted
data drop off—with one exception. The correlation
between gross state product and business loans goes
up from 38 percent to 43 percent.
The results using the adjusted
data show how interstate branching can affect the data.
The correlation coefficients are all higher—in
some cases substantially so—than those calculated
with the unadjusted data. Again, business loans show
the highest correlations, reaching 70 percent when using
the business-cycle index as the measure of economic
activity.
Overall, a Good Thing
Conventional measures of
local lending are inadequate to see the true picture
of loan volume on a regional basis. Branches of banks
based elsewhere lend in Texas, but their activity is
difficult to gauge because they aren’t required
to report. Only by adjusting for the effects of interstate
banking can we avoid understating the amount of lending
activity actually taking place in the state.
While interstate branching may
render regional lending measures inadequate, it has
brought a number of benefits to banks and their customers
through reduced restrictions and costs. It also has
allowed banks to diversify, so that they are less vulnerable
to regional economic shocks. Some evidence suggests
that interstate banking has helped dampen regional business
cycles.[6] As a result, the U.S. banking
industry is likely in better shape now than when it
was regionally constrained.
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Banks
vs. Branches
A bank is a separately
chartered institution, with its own management,
board of directors, accounting statements
and capital. A branch, on the other hand,
is a bank office. While branches have managers,
they don’t have their own charters,
accounting statements or boards of directors,
and they aren’t subject to capital
requirements. Branches are cheaper and generally
more efficient to operate than banks, yet
they offer many of the services head offices
do.
With the advent of
interstate banking in 1994, the number of
banks declined across the nation (Chart
A). But banking services didn’t
go away. The number of branches began to
grow dramatically, and they now total over
70,000.

The 1994 legislation
removing restrictions on interstate banking
allowed states to opt out, which Texas and
Montana originally did. In 1998, however,
Texas relented.* Montana allowed branching
in 2001.
Texas, like the nation,
has seen a decline in the number of banks,
but it now has more than 5,000 branches
in operation (Chart B).

*The Riegle–Neal
Act authorized interstate branching to begin
in 1997. The act also imposed a 10 percent
nationwide concentration limit for a single
institution’s control of deposits
and a 30 percent statewide limit, but states
were free to choose a different limit. Texas
has a 20 percent concentration limit. Moreover,
Texas law generally prohibits out-of-state
institutions from establishing new, or de
novo, branches. It requires that any bank
they purchase be at least five years old. |
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| About
the Author
Robinson is a senior
economist and policy advisor at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
The author would like
to thank Kelly Klemme for valuable research
assistance.
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Prior to interstate
branching, many states allowed out-of-state
bank holding companies to operate banks
within their borders. Even prior to
these agreements, banks could lend across
state lines by establishing loan production
offices in different states. Also, many
states set up agreements with each other
to allow an out-of-state banking presence.
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Some of the lending
reported at Texas banks could be extended
to customers located outside the state.
Loans outstanding are used because all
banks report these series, while only
larger banks report originations.
-
The adjustment entails
removing a bank from the prior year’s
calculations if it was converted to
a branch of an out-of-state bank. In
this way, the transformation does not
affect the growth rates of the loan
series.
-
Under the Community
Reinvestment Act, banks also report
their small business loans based on
the size of the loan. These data show
Texas banks reported more small business
loans in Texas than out-of-state institutions
did until 2004.
-
It is important to
keep in mind that correlation does not
imply causation. That is, just because
two series are highly correlated does
not mean that one series is the result
of or causes movements in the other.
-
“Bank Integration
and State Business Cycles,” by
Donald P. Morgan, Bertrand Rime and
Philip E. Strahan, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, November 2004, pp.
1555–84.
About Southwest Economy
Southwest Economy
is published six times annually by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed
are those of the authors and should not
be attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted
on the condition that the source is credited
and a copy is provided to the Research Department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Southwest Economy
is available free of charge by writing the
Public Affairs Department, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 655906, Dallas,
TX 75265-5906, or by telephoning (214) 922-5254. |
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