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Issue 2, March/April 2006
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Did NAFTA Spur Texas Exports?
By Anil Kumar
The North American Free Trade
Agreement unites the United States, Mexico and Canada—three
nations with a combined population of 426 million, total
output of more than $13 trillion and regional trade
of $700 billion in goods and services.
Because of the North American
market’s sheer size, NAFTA has been repeatedly
dissected. Most studies have sought to determine whether
the pact fulfilled proponents’ predictions of
increased trade, lower prices and higher incomes or
led to what critics warned would be a “giant sucking
sound” of U.S. jobs going to Mexico.
On balance, researchers have found
NAFTA a slight positive for the U.S. as a whole. For
example, a 1996 study estimated that NAFTA had increased
U.S. exports by $5 billion, or 12 percent, a figure
projected to grow as more of NAFTA’s phased-in
trade liberalization took effect.[1]
A lesser volume of research focuses
on what NAFTA has meant to state and local economies,
although theory and common sense suggest trade deals
might have different impacts within countries. States’
industrial mixes and workforces vary widely, leading
to comparative advantages that influence the composition
and destination of exports. Geography is another key
factor. Firms may operate in one state rather than another
to take advantage of proximity to newly opened markets.
The results of national studies of NAFTA’s effects
may not apply uniformly to all states.
Texas is one of the more interesting
lenses through which to assess NAFTA. The state lies
near the center of NAFTA’s economic space—about
equidistant from Mexico City and Toronto, with a 1,200-mile
frontier with Mexico and networks of highways and rail
lines that lead to some of the world’s busiest
border crossings. Texas political and business leaders
strongly supported NAFTA’s ratification, an indication
that many presumed it would benefit the state’s
economy.
Has NAFTA been good for Texas?
Merely counting the truckloads passing through border
checkpoints in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, Laredo and
El Paso would make it seem so. A more definitive answer,
though, involves distilling NAFTA’s influence
from factors responsible for overall increases in Texas
exports over the past decade or so.
NAFTA can’t be deemed a
success for Texas if rising exports to Mexico merely
represent sales diverted from markets elsewhere in the
world. Trade theory suggests that overall economic effects
of NAFTA and other preferential trade agreements depend
on trade creation net of trade diversion (see
box).
A fresh look at the issue, using
industry-level export data, shows that NAFTA did indeed
increase Texas’ sales to Mexico—and to Canada
as well. Perhaps more interesting, NAFTA also helped
raise Texas exports to Asia, Europe and Latin America,
making a strong case for net trade creation.
Before and After NAFTA
NAFTA went into effect Jan.
1, 1994. In general, it mandated eliminating trade barriers
by 2008. For many products, the agreement did away with
tariffs and other restraints immediately. Agriculture
and apparel were the main sectors scheduled to be liberalized
over a longer period.
Pre-NAFTA
Mexico had the more protected economy, so it committed
to larger tariff cuts than the U.S. and Canada. Average
Mexican duties on U.S. goods fell from 12 percent in
1993 to 1.3 percent in 2001, while U.S. tariffs on Mexican
goods declined from 2.1 percent to 0.2 percent.[2] The
effect of NAFTA on U.S.–Canada trade restraints
was minimal because the two countries operated under
a free-trade agreement that took effect in 1989.
Trade has increased by leaps and
bounds in the NAFTA years. U.S. exports to Mexico rose
from $42 billion in 1993 to $111 billion in 2004, while
imports from Mexico increased from $40 billion to $156
billion. Over the same period, U.S. sales to Canada
grew from $100 billion to $189 billion, while imports
from Canada to the U.S. climbed from $111 billion to
$256 billion.
During the first six years of
NAFTA, Texas gained ground in many foreign markets,
allowing the state to grow faster than the nation in
overall exports (Chart 1A). Texas exports to
Mexico also increased—but not by any more than
the nation as a whole. From 1994 to 2000, the growth
of Texas shipments across the Rio Grande mirrored that
of U.S. exports, just as it did in the five years prior
to NAFTA’s taking effect (Chart 1B).[3]
Indeed, both Texas and U.S. exports to Mexico grew steadily
before and after NAFTA, except for a sharp decline in
1995, the year following the pact’s implementation.
An economic crisis in Mexico led to a steep devaluation
of the peso vis-à-vis the dollar, making U.S.
exports to Mexico more expensive.
Given Texas’ proximity to
Mexico, it might be surprising that the state didn’t
increase its market share under NAFTA. Interestingly,
one of the expanding markets has been Canada, the NAFTA
partner farther from Texas (Chart 1C).
Although trade grew faster with
Canada, there’s no denying the importance of Mexico
to the state’s economy. In 1993, nearly 40 percent
of Texas’ exports went to Mexico, compared with
less than 10 percent of overall U.S. exports (Chart
2). The state trailed the U.S. average in sales
to Canada and all other regions except Latin America.
In the NAFTA years, Mexico has
become even more dominant as a market for Texas. By
2000, Mexico received more than 45 percent of Texas’
exports, and Canada also gained as a destination for
Texas products.

Broad-based data
on exports suggest continuity rather than change in
the first years NAFTA was in effect. Texas and the U.S.
sold more to Mexico and Canada in 2000 than they did
in 1993, but general trade patterns didn’t change
all that much in the six-year period. NAFTA’s
impacts on the Texas economy emerge more clearly by
looking at the changes in exports by industry.
Looking at Industry Data
For both the U.S. and Texas,
the leading exports are largely the same—industrial
machinery including computer equipment, transportation
equipment, electronics, chemicals and instruments (Chart
3). They reflect America’s comparative advantages
in the global marketplace. Texas’ mix differs
from the rest of the country—electronics, for
example, has emerged as a particular strength for the
state. Even so, the same five categories were at the
top before NAFTA in 1993 and after it in 2000.

In terms of overall exports, some
major Texas industries show distinct breaks from their
pre-NAFTA trends (Chart 4). Texas electronics
companies, for example, saw their exports grow significantly
faster after NAFTA went into effect. Chemicals, which
were dropping prior to the trade deal, began to rise
after its implementation. After an initial decline due
to Mexico’s peso crisis of 1994, transportation
equipment experienced an uptick in its growth rate.

Not all sectors show rising exports.
Texas sales of lumber and wood had been increasing before
1994 but declined after NAFTA. Furniture and fixtures
shows a similar pattern.
Industry data suggest churning
beneath the surface for Texas exports. How much of it
can be attributed to NAFTA? The answer requires a model
that takes into account other factors that might contribute
to the state’s expanding overseas sales. Income
growth in Texas and Mexico would affect exports because
richer countries tend to buy more overseas. The real
exchange rate between the U.S. and Mexico is especially
important because the period under study includes Mexico’s
peso crisis, which induced wide swings in trade.
The worldwide march toward freer
trade deserves consideration because it, too, could
be expected to increase Texas exports. Since 1990, nations
have signed more than 180 regional free-trade agreements.
Among the more important ones were the European Union’s
steps toward integration in 1992 and the liberalization
in Latin America symbolized by the Southern Common Market,
or Mercosur.
Controlling for incomes, a time
trend, exchange rates, the EU opening, Mercosur and
other industry- or country-specific factors allows us
to isolate NAFTA’s impact on 28 Texas industries.
When it comes to exports to Mexico, 19 of these industries
benefited from NAFTA, while nine saw sales decline.
Texas exports to Canada rose for 18 industries and fell
for 10. Half of the 28 industries gained in both countries,
while six declined in both countries (Chart 5).

Industries with statistically
significant gains in exports to Mexico as a result of
NAFTA were rubber and miscellaneous plastic products
(79 percent), printing and publishing (78 percent),
textile mill products (75 percent), petroleum and coal
products (69 percent), leather and leather products
(71 percent) and electronic equipment (49 percent).
Significant declines were found in lumber and wood products
(89 percent) and furniture and fixtures (75 percent).
The statistically significant
NAFTA winners in terms of exports to Canada were oil
and gas exploration equipment (286 percent), furniture
and fixtures (75 percent), industrial machinery including
computers (70 percent), apparel (66 percent), instruments
and related products (58 percent) and rubber and miscellaneous
plastic products (54 percent). The only significant
decline was in metal mining (88 percent).
The diversity in gains and losses
of exports among industries suggests trade deals affect
economic sectors differently. Lower tariffs no doubt
gave some Texas industries an advantage over Mexican
and Canadian companies. Export declines might signal
an inability to compete, although they could simply
reflect some firms’ decisions to shift economic
activity to other states. Because Texas had more winners
than losers, though, we can conclude that NAFTA in general
made Texas industries more competitive.
Overall, NAFTA had an export-weighted
average effect of 28 percent on Texas exports to Mexico.
Adjusted for inflation, the trade deal accounted for
roughly a quarter of Texas’ 111 percent increase
in exports to Mexico between 1993 and 2000.
During the same period, Texas’
NAFTA-related exports to Canada rose 47 percent, or
about a third of the state’s 131 percent gain
in that market. Texas sells quite a bit more to Mexico
than to Canada. Even if the percentage effect is smaller,
the NAFTA-led increases in exports to Mexico are larger
in dollar terms.
The results indicate that NAFTA
stimulated Texas’ exports. These findings are
similar to those of a St. Louis Fed study.[4] Using
a different state-level database covering the years
1988 to 1997, they estimated that NAFTA increased Texas
exports to Mexico by 14 percent and to Canada by 28
percent.
Global Gains
Did gains in the Mexican
and Canadian markets come at the expense of exports
to the rest of the world?
The answer is no. In addition
to boosting North American sales, NAFTA also contributed
to moderate gains in Texas’ exports to other parts
of the world. The trade deal helped boost sales by 17
percent in Latin America, not including Mexico; 15 percent
in Europe; and 13 percent in Asia.
NAFTA didn’t open non-North
American markets, so why would it help Texas exports
to the rest of the world? The answer likely lies in
the reorganization of production that comes with exposure
to the global marketplace. As North American trade barriers
fell, Texas exporters had new incentives to become more
competitive, perhaps by cutting costs to match rivals’
prices or by incorporating lower-priced inputs from
Mexico. Other factors might also be at work. The international-trade
expertise that firms gained by selling to Mexico may
have helped them penetrate Europe, Asia and elsewhere.
Countries may have informally reduced import barriers
as part of a strategy to achieve free-trade agreements
with the U.S.
The estimates of NAFTA’s
impacts on Texas exports don’t account for Mexico’s
highly successful maquiladora program, which allows
U.S. goods to enter Mexico duty-free for further processing
and re-export to the United States.
In the debate leading to NAFTA’s
ratification, experts differed on how the trade pact
would affect the maquiladoras. Some thought it would
strengthen them by boosting investment in the plants.
Others argued that it would erode the maquilas’
advantage by lowering tariffs on nearly all imports
to Mexico.
Maquiladora
employment has grown steadily for decades, but it accelerated
under NAFTA (Chart 6). However, a 2001 Dallas
Fed study concluded that NAFTA had a negative but statistically
insignificant influence on the maquiladoras.[5] If the
industry hadn’t weakened, the estimates of NAFTA’s
effects on Texas exports would have been larger.
Texas now ranks as America’s
top exporting state, with about 14 percent of the nation’s
overseas sales. At least some of the gains can be attributed
to NAFTA, which boosted 2000 exports by an estimated
23 percent above their pre-NAFTA 1993 levels. The trade
pact’s gains have been broadly based. Exports
to Mexico rose—as many expected—but Texas
products have also found expanding markets in Canada,
Europe, Asia and Latin America as a direct result of
NAFTA. The added overseas sales amount to a moderate
gain for the state’s economy, leading to faster
growth and new jobs.
More Texas exports are only half
the story. NAFTA also operated at the industry level,
prompting a reorganization consistent with the theory
of comparative advantage. As North American barriers
fell, such knowledge- and capital-intensive industries
as electronics, chemicals, transportation equipment
and industrial machinery received a stimulating jolt.
Labor-intensive industries, like lumber and furniture,
couldn’t maintain their exports.
The data don’t allow industry-specific
assessment of NAFTA beyond 2000. However, the steady
increase in overall Texas exports in recent years at
least suggests that NAFTA continues to exert a positive
effect on the state’s economy.
«Previous
article | Next Article»
Trade
Creation Versus Trade Diversion
Preferential trade
agreements impose lower tariffs on trade
in goods and services among their member
countries. Even with expansion of the multinational
World Trade Organization in recent years,
nations have found these regional deals
increasingly attractive, concluding more
than 180 pacts since 1990.
Two types of preferential
deals are common. Free trade areas, such
as NAFTA, reduce tariffs on goods from member
countries but allow each nation to set its
own duties for nonmembers. Customs unions,
such as the European Union, agree to impose
a common tariff wall on imports from nonmember
countries. In economic terms, they’re
similar, so the following discussion applies
to both.
These preferential
agreements would normally violate the WTO’s
most favored nation rules, which require
each member to extend to other members the
lowest tariff applicable on all goods and
services. In other words, there should be
no discrimination or preference in tariffs.
To allow the existence of free trade agreements
and customs unions, WTO rules exempt them
from the most favored nation rule if they
mandate complete tariff elimination among
member countries and if tariffs to nonmembers
are no higher than they were before.
Both theory and experience
suggest that free trade increases economic
welfare. Does the proposition hold for preferential
deals as well?
Jacob Viner provided
the answer in his classic 1950 book, The
Customs Union Issue. It introduced
two important concepts—trade creation,
which denotes new imports and exports, and
trade diversion, which means a mere shifting
of sources from one country to another.
Viner argued that only trade deals that
lead to net trade creation would improve
economic welfare. If net trade diversion
occurs primarily by shifting production
from a low-cost nonmember country to a high-cost
member country, it will hurt overall economic
welfare. |
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| About
the Author
Kumar is an economist
in the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
The author thanks
Jason Saving, Mine Yücel and Steve
Brown for insightful comments.
- “Distinguishing
NAFTA from the Peso Crisis,”[PDF]
by David M. Gould, Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas Southwest Economy,
Issue 5, September/October 1996.
- “The Effects of NAFTA on U.S.–Mexican
Trade and GDP,” Congressional Budget
Office, May 2003.
- The analysis can’t be continued
past 2000. The World Institute of Social
and Economic Research compiles state-level
export figures, providing added detail
by industry. The switch from Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) to the
North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) means data since 2001 cannot
be compared with earlier periods.
- “NAFTA and the Changing Pattern
of State Exports,” by Cletus C.
Coughlin and Howard J. Wall, Working Paper
2000-029, Research Division, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, October 2000.
- “Was
NAFTA Behind Mexico’s High Maquiladora
Growth?”[PDF] by William C.
Gruben, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Economic and Financial Review, Third
Quarter 2001.
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Southwest Economy
Southwest Economy
is published six times annually by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed
are those of the authors and should not
be attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
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