|
Issue 6, November/December 2002
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Have REITs Helped Tame Texas Real Estate?
Texas is known for its turbulent real
estate cycles. More than once, a run-up in the sector has
suddenly reversed course, stranding investors with massive
amounts of overvalued but underoccupied real estate. Newfound
wealth has often vanished nearly as fast as it appeared. However,
despite Texas' propensity for cyclical extremes, evidence
suggests its real estate markets may now be less volatile
than in the past.
The Texas real estate landscape has
changed considerably in the last two decades. Some changes
have been unmistakable. For example, gone are the days of
misguided tax policy, which granted investors large tax breaks
for developing real estate. Gone also are the days when unbridled
savings and loans could throw money at virtually any project.
Such notable changes have added stability to Texas real estate
markets.
Other changes have been more subtle
but not without effect. Of particular interest has been the
shift of ownership from private hands to publicly held real
estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs are real estate companies
that own and manage properties and whose shares are traded
on a public stock exchange. In general, REITs can enhance
market discipline by improving efficiency, increasing liquidity
and discouraging unjustified lending. They do this, in part,
by facilitating improved information gathering and sharing.
While the proportion of total real estate owned by REITs is
still modest, economic intuition suggests that the increased
number of REITs might help moderate market volatility.
This article discusses REIT activity
and trends at the national level. It then explores the growth
of REITs in Texas and analyzes Texas REIT performance against
the overall equity market. Finally, it enumerates some of
the differences between the current Texas real estate environment
and that of the 1980s and examines REITs' effect on the state's
real estate markets.
REITs in the United States
A REIT engages in some combination
of buying, selling, operating or financing income-producing
properties. Such properties can include apartments, retail
establishments, office buildings, hotels and warehouses.
REITs differ from traditional real estate
companies—which are often private partnerships—because their
shares are publicly traded. Additionally, REITs are required
by law to pay at least 90 percent of taxable income to shareholders
in the form of dividends.[1] In return, REITs can deduct dividends
from their corporate tax bill. As a result, most REITs distribute
all of their taxable income as dividends, avoiding corporate
income taxation. (They are still required to pay property
tax.)
Congress established REITs in 1960 to
enable a wider segment of the investing public to own income-producing
real estate. In effect, REITs make real estate ownership more
accessible by breaking large fixed assets into bite-size shares
and lowering other barriers to investment. With the advent
of REITs, shareholders are able to extract the benefits of
owning professionally managed real estate without being subject
to the risks of just a single property. REITs also provide
liquidity to their investors. In contrast to private partnerships,
REIT investors can quickly dump real estate holdings by selling
their shares in the market.
REITs fall into three functional categories.
Equity REITs acquire and operate income-producing properties.
Mortgage REITs lend money to real estate operators. And hybrid
REITs do some of both. In theory, a management team carries
out the REIT's daily operations, and a board of directors
makes investment decisions.[2] However, in practice, directors
often just sign off on investment decisions already made by
management.
Even though REITs emerged over 40 years
ago, it was some time before the industry picked up steam.
Early growth was limited because REITs were only allowed to
own real estate, not manage it. This arrangement curtailed
growth because investors were reluctant to entrust property
operations to a third party with possibly misaligned incentives.
Also, interest in REITs stumbled initially because private
real estate investors could exploit a tax shelter not available
to REITs; consequently, REITs were less able to compete for
capital.
With passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, the picture changed. The legislation boasted a two-pronged
adjustment to real estate investment, opening up the sector
to brisk growth. First, it curtailed opportunities for tax
shelters in private real estate investment. Second, it expanded
REITs' autonomy by permitting them to manage and operate properties,
not just own them. When the fallout from the 1980s real estate
depression and the savings and loan crisis finally began to
clear, REITs were poised for rapid growth.[3]
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Starting in the mid-1980s, the number
of REITs trading on the New York, American and Nasdaq exchanges
began a steady upward trend, peaking at 226 in 1994, then
scaling back to 180 by 2002.[4] The increase in REITs was
followed by a dramatic upsurge in the sector's overall market
capitalization. Between 1992 and 2002, total REIT market capitalization
increased more than eightfold (Chart 1).[5] Growth
was so dramatic that by 2001, REITs controlled roughly 15
percent of the $2 trillion worth of investment-grade commercial
properties in the United States.[6] In fact, by 2001 REITs
controlled 40 percent of the equity portion (as opposed to
debt) of institutional real estate, up from around 1 percent
in 1993.[7]
The REIT Modernization Act of 1999 gave
REITs new opportunities to increase earnings. The act enabled
REITs to offer more sophisticated services, thus helping them
maintain a competitive stance in the marketplace. The progression
of legislation since REITs' inception in 1960 has helped the
industry flourish.
Coincident with REIT growth was a more
controlled real estate environment throughout the 1990s. New
inventory relative to absorption was more measured in the
1990s than the 1980s, and rent growth was more robust (Table
1).
| Table 1 |
| U.S. Real Estate, Then and Now |
|
|
1981–90 |
1991–2000 |
| Inventory
added (million square feet) |
1,319.7 |
406.7 |
| Increase
in inventory |
98% |
15% |
| Absorption
(million square feet) |
887.3 |
647.9 |
| Inventory
added/absorbed |
149% |
63% |
| Rental
rate increase in nominal dollars |
7% |
51% |
| Occupancy
change |
–13% |
11% |
|
| SOURCES: Torto Wheaton Research;
Crescent Real Estate Co. |
Some observers have argued that during
the 2001–02 downturn, REITs helped prevent a return
to the overcapacity problems that plagued the 1980s.[8] As
the industry matured, improved information flow and transparency
helped discourage inordinate construction. Despite stratospheric
stock market hype during the 1990s, new office construction
never reached the excesses of the '80s. In fact, during the
recent weakness in national real estate markets, new completions
dropped off before vacancy rates even started edging upward.
During the '80s, vacancy rates shot up over 20 percent before
completions ever began to decline (Chart 2).
 |
Sharp corrections are still possible,
however. Real spending on U.S. nonresidential building has
already declined 26.8 percent since peaking in 2001 (and will
likely decline more before bottoming out), just below the
total decline of 33.3 percent during the 1990–91 recession.[9]
While this reversal has damaged the real estate sector, it
is also a sign of increased market nimbleness and improved
ability to react to changing conditions. Much of the run-up
in spending in the late '90s was driven by stock market hype.
That the industry has been able to retrench so quickly helped
avert a more severe overbuilding problem.
Historically, real estate supply and
demand have often marched to their own drummer. However, as
REITs own and manage more real estate, there is likely to
be a tighter alignment between supply and demand. REITs raise
much of their capital through equity markets, making it more
difficult for them to pursue irrational investment plans.
In addition, REITs must always act to preserve stock value
and eschew activities that might undermine it. Analyst and
investor scrutiny of REITs has given the market the ability
to quickly punish firms with investment agendas that aren't
justified by the fundamentals. While REITs won't erase the
sector's cyclical makeup, their presence may be contributing
to increased market solidity.
REITs in Texas
REITs are playing an increasingly
important role in Texas real estate as well. The state is
ranked fifth in the nation in total number of operating REITs,
fifth in combined REIT market capitalization and seventh in
total REIT employment. The biggest REIT markets are Illinois,
California and New York (Table 2).
| Table 2 |
| Top 10 REIT Markets |
|
|
Total market cap (millions of
dollars) |
Number of REITs |
Total employment |
Average annual dividend per
share (dollars) |
Average dividend yield (percent) |
|
1. Illinois |
27,676 |
11 |
15,083 |
1.65 |
6.5 |
|
2. California |
24,197 |
29 |
9,375 |
1.51 |
6.6 |
|
3. New York |
24,158 |
25 |
5,975 |
1.29 |
7.1 |
|
4. Maryland |
9,831 |
13 |
7,913 |
.87 |
4.2 |
|
5. Texas |
8,413 |
10 |
3,067 |
1.86 |
8.4 |
|
6. Massachusetts |
7,939 |
5 |
925 |
1.46 |
6.3 |
|
7. Pennsylvania |
5,559 |
10 |
1,881 |
1.46 |
7.7 |
|
8. Tennessee |
4,178 |
7 |
15,834 |
1.60 |
7.5 |
|
9. Georgia |
4,077 |
7 |
3,123 |
1.38 |
7.4 |
|
10. Florida |
3,843 |
8 |
1,129 |
1.09 |
6.0 |
|
| NOTE: Tennessee's unusually high
REIT employment is attributable to a single company, National
Health Reality, which owns 23 health care facilities. |
| SOURCE: Bloomberg. |
Texas-based REITs are all headquartered
in either the Dallas/Fort Worth or Houston metropolitan areas,
though their real estate holdings may be located anywhere
in the country. Some REITs with operations and headquarters
in Texas are actually incorporated in Maryland because of
its more favorable tax and regulatory environment for REITs.
Most Texas REITs own and operate various types of real estate,
including office, retail, multifamily, restaurant and hotel
properties. One Texas REIT, Capstead Mortgage Corp., is a
mortgage REIT that loans money to real estate owners and operators.
(See the box titled "Some Large Texas REITs.")
Some Large
Texas REITs
The following list provides
a snapshot of some prominent REITs based in Texas.
Size and core business strategy were the basis
for selection to the list.
| Name
|
Location |
Employees |
Investment
Strategy |
Market
cap
(October 2002) |
| Camden
Property Trust |
Houston |
1,750 |
Mid-
to upper-market multifamily properties
in nine Sunbelt and Midwestern states. |
$1.26 billion |
| Capstead
Mortgage Corp. |
Dallas |
16 |
Real
estate-related assets such as single-family
residential mortgage-backed securities
issued by government-sponsored entities.
Does not have a core geographic focus.
|
$290 million |
| Crescent
Real Estate Equities Co. |
Fort Worth |
794 |
Office,
resort/hotel, residential development
and temperature-controlled warehouses.
Holdings concentrated in Dallas/Fort
Worth and Houston. |
$1.62 billion |
| FelCor
Lodging Trust |
Irving |
61 |
Hotel
properties in the United States, mainly
Texas, California, Florida and Georgia,
and in Canada. |
$582 million |
| Prentiss
Properties Trust |
Dallas |
650 |
Office
and industrial properties in the Midwest,
Southwest, Northern Virginia, Northern
and Southern California. |
$1.04 billion |
| U.S.
Restaurant Properties |
Dallas |
181 |
Operates
811 restaurant and service station properties
in 48 states. $257 million Weingarten
Realty Investors Houston 265 Retail
properties and, secondarily, industrial
holdings in the southern half of the
United States. |
$1.95 billion |
|
| NOTES: Technically, La
Quinta Corp. of Irving and Wyndham International
of Dallas are REITs because their primary
Standardized Industrial Code is 6798-01, or
"real estate investment trust." However, these
two companies were excluded because their
operations differ substantially from the REITs
mentioned. The REITs above have holdings in
one or more of the office, industrial, retail,
multifamily or hotel market segments. In contrast,
La Quinta and Wyndham focus exclusively on
hotel ownership and management, effectively
operating as large national and international
hotel chains. As such, they fall outside the
scope of this article. Relatively small REITs
were also excluded, including Transcontinental
Realty Investors, Dallas; PMC Commercial Trust,
Dallas; Income Opportunity Realty Investors,
Dallas; FFP Real Estate Trust, Fort Worth;
Liberté Investors, Dallas; Texas Pacific
Land Trust, Dallas; and AMRESCO Capital Trust,
Dallas. |
| SOURCES: Bloomberg; Yahoo!
Finance; Multex.com, Inc. Market Guide. |
|
|
The effect of growing REIT numbers in
Texas has not been trivial. For one, the sector has made efficiency
gains. Because shares are traded on public exchanges, investors
receive real-time feedback on the sector's relative well-being.
Any negative information, such as oversupply risks, gets factored
into equity prices, helping safeguard against unrealistic
zeal and lessening the chance of the kind of market blindsiding
that has afflicted Texas real estate in the past.
The growing incidence and size of REITs
have also helped the Texas real estate sector capture economies
of scale. Such economies occur when the average cost of a
firm's product declines as the firm expands the size of its
operations. REITs capture economies of scale through brand
imaging, access to lower-cost capital, management productivity
and increased bargaining power with customers and suppliers.[10]
For example, Texas REITs can spread out insurance costs by
purchasing umbrella insurance for multiple properties. Such
risk mitigation isn't generally feasible for firms with relatively
small numbers of properties.[11]
Another effect of higher REIT numbers
in Texas has been added discipline through improved monitoring
of capital flows to real estate. Historically, lending institutions
such as savings and loans, insurance companies and banks committed
a pool of money to real estate at the beginning of each year,
regardless of any changes that might take place in overall
real estate conditions. Such dedicated lending was unresponsive
to swings in the marketplace and often led to overinvestment.
Real estate companies still get loan commitments that can
be insensitive to changing real estate conditions; however,
this kind of lending is less prevalent than it used to be.[12]
 |
With REITs, when real estate indicators
signal weakness in the fundamentals, equity markets adjust
and capital shifts away from the industry. Thus, money is
free to flow to the most promising opportunity, not some predetermined
investment. This phenomenon has helped fill the long-standing
demand for liquidity in what has otherwise been an illiquid
industry. Texas REITs have helped improve market sensitivity
to changing conditions, as shown by capital flight from REIT
stocks in 1998 when real estate markets weakened (Chart
3).
Finally, the requirement that REITs
distribute 90 percent of income through dividends builds in
an added measure of discipline because they can only accumulate
a limited amount of income to fund future growth. The result
is that REITs must appeal to capital markets whenever they
want to raise more debt or equity funding. They can't fund
their future investments with internal sources.[13]
Over the last few years, stock prices
of Texas REITs have fared relatively well compared with the
overall market (Chart 4). From January 2000 to June
2002, stock price appreciation of the largest Texas REITs
easily outperformed the Standard & Poor's 500. However,
extending the horizon back to January 1997, only Camden Property
Trust, Weingarten Realty and Prentiss Properties Trust outperformed
the S&P index. Texas REITs outperformed the market during
the tech bust but underperformed it in the boom years.

Total returns to REIT shareholders are
a combination of stock price appreciation or depreciation
and dividends paid out. Table 3 shows a variety of variables
used to measure REIT performance. Dividend yields for the
largest Texas REITs have been strong in the past year. Total
returns for Texas REITs have been mixed but trending downward.
| Table 3 |
| Texas REIT Performance |
| Name |
Ticker |
Stock
price* |
Total
return (ytd, %) |
Dividend
yield (%) |
Funds
from operations (2002E) ($/share) |
Multiple
(stock price/ FFO) |
Net
asset value 2002:2 ($/share) |
Prem/
(Disc) to NAV (%) |
| Camden
Property Trust |
CPT |
31.3 |
–9.5 |
8.0 |
3.4 |
9.2 |
33.3 |
–5.9 |
| Capstead
Mortgage Corp. |
CMO |
20.5 |
— |
25.3 |
5.3 |
4.0 |
— |
— |
| Crescent
Real Estate Equities Co. |
CEI |
15.6 |
–7.8 |
9.6 |
2.0 |
7.8 |
20.8 |
–25.1 |
| FelCor
Lodging Trust |
FCH |
11.1 |
–31.1 |
5.4 |
2.1 |
5.2 |
18.4 |
–40.0 |
| Prentiss
Properties Trust |
PP |
26.6 |
2.8 |
8.4 |
3.4 |
7.9 |
32.4 |
–17.9 |
| U.S.
Restaurant Properties |
USV |
12.9 |
–4.7 |
10.2 |
1.4 |
9.2 |
13.3 |
–2.9 |
| Weingarten
Realty Investors |
WRI |
37.2 |
21.5 |
6.0 |
3.2 |
11.5 |
30.9 |
20.4 |
|
* As of October 25, 2002.
NOTES: Total return includes stock price appreciation
and reinvested dividends. Dividend yield is annualized,
year-to-date dividends divided by stock price; this
variable effectively gives an interest rate yield on
a stock purchase. Funds from operations (FFO) is analogous
to corporate earnings but excludes gains or losses from
sales of property or debt restructuring and adds back
depreciation of real estate. Multiple is analogous to
corporate price/earnings ratio, or what the market is
paying for $1 of earnings. Net asset value (NAV) is
a per share measure of the market value of a REIT's
net assets. Prem/(Disc) to NAV [(stock price/NAV–1)
100] is the premium or discount of the current share
price associated with the net asset value of the company.
|
| SOURCES: Salomon Smith Barney; Yahoo!
Finance. |
During an economic downturn, high-dividend
stocks are generally favorable for a portfolio. However, the
current data point to a rather weak REIT market going forward.
Fundamental real estate conditions in Texas have grown increasingly
tenuous in recent quarters. Vacancy rates are up everywhere
in Texas since last year, and rental rates have fallen. Until
job growth returns, signaling an increase in demand for space,
excess capacity will continue to exert downward pressure on
Texas REIT returns.
This Time It Really Is Different
Still, the current weakness in
Texas real estate is relatively benign by historical measures.
Even though commercial and residential markets have both taken
hits in the past 18 months, the situation is less extreme
than the 1980s increase and subsequent derailment (Chart
5). During those years, investors watched in dismay as
bloated commercial contract values collapsed, office rents
gave back half their peak value and residential markets took
on a burdensome two-year inventory of homes.[14]

The environment is less severe now.
Present weakness, while keenly felt in some sectors, isn't
nearly as encompassing as the pall that settled on Texas two
decades ago. Much of this is due to the fact that Texas real
estate markets haven't had as far to fall this time. In the
1970s, a run-up in oil prices cast a rosy hue on the energy-dependent
state economy, and many assumed—unrealistically—that robust
energy markets were here to stay. The optimism spilled over
to real estate markets, and construction crews kicked into
gear.
Later, in the 1980s, federal policy
gave tax advantages to investors willing to finance real estate
projects, feeding the building frenzy. At the same time, deregulation
freed savings and loans to invest in service corporations,
disregard geographical considerations in loan decisions and
lend up to 40 percent of assets in commercial real estate.
But the new legislation failed to implement higher deposit
insurance premiums for savings and loans with precarious loan
portfolios.[15] Exacerbating the problem was the failure of
federal and state regulators to shut down insolvent thrifts,
which were financing real estate projects that would have
otherwise gone unfunded.
The combination of these forces rocketed
Texas real estate markets to dizzying heights. But the fundamentals
were never in place to support the rapid growth. Eventually
the party ended (helped by the Tax Reform Act of 1986), leaving
in its place a huge disequilibrium between supply and demand.
The consequent imbalance sent property values and rents to
damaging lows and dealt massive losses to real estate institutions.[16]
In contrast to the overhyped '80s, a
speculative building free-for-all didn't occur in the late
'90s, and the current downturn has been far less pronounced.
Recent jumps in subleasing and vacancy rates, along with liberal
rent concessions, have been somewhat isolated, materializing
in tech-laden areas—such as Austin, the Dallas suburb of Richardson
and Irving's Los Colinas business center—and not as much in
the overall marketplace.
Even though excessive growth expectations
seduced equity markets in the late 1990s and an office glut
resulted, the memory of the '80s real estate meltdown helped
curb Texas builders. What's more, significant changes in the
way real estate gets funded helped control the recent buildup.
During the 1980s, Texas lending institutions loaned money
to practically anyone with a hammer and saw. This time, regulatory
fixes prompted tighter scrutiny of capital flows, increased
discipline and more transparency. Also, in reaction to 1980s
abuses, banks now require a higher equity stake from potential
loan recipients. Such hurdles have curbed frivolous lending.
In addition to these changes, the increased
prominence of REITs in Texas may have helped contribute to
a less frenetic buildup. Markets can punish REITs for ill-advised
investment strategies by shunning REIT stocks. This dynamic
was not available in the 1980s because REITs had not yet become
a material part of the real estate market; they didn't really
take off until the early 1990s. The gradual shift of real
estate assets from private partnerships to public REITs has
increased the sector's transparency, discipline and sensitivity
to market conditions.
Still, the extent to which REITs foster
increased discipline is contingent on whether markets function
correctly in the first place. Accurate information (not corporate
book cooking), rule of law (not executive malfeasance) and
transparency (not covert and obscure business dealings) are
essential to well-functioning markets. Without these, any
positive effects from REITs would be negligible.
REITs' Continuing Influence
That the recent boom and bust in
technology markets has not yielded a 1980s-like crash in real
estate markets suggests some things have changed in Texas
in the last two decades. The '90s boom never matched the skyscraping
'80s, and it is unlikely the current downturn will be as protracted
as the one that gripped the state from 1985 through the early
1990s. Rolling back perverse tax incentives and fixing the
savings and loan problem were largely responsible for the
improvement. Additionally, the increased incidence of REITs
owning and managing real estate in Texas and the subsequent
availability of more timely information may be having a positive
effect.
REITs are not a fail-safe mechanism
to avert irrational run-ups in real estate markets. If nothing
else, the 1990s tech boom illustrated that investors still
get caught up in bubble markets. It's too early to tell what
ultimate effect REITs will have on the marketplace. Evidence
in their favor is insufficient, and more research is needed;
plus, they still make up a relatively small part of the overall
market. But REITs have the potential to enhance the role of
market discipline in real estate finance. They can also help
improve funding and investment controls and add efficiencies
and liquidity to the market.
Historical examples of misalignment
between fundamental real estate conditions and investor decision-making
abound. Significant improvements in real estate markets over
the past 20 years have contributed discipline to the real
estate sector, however. As part of these changes, restraint
imposed on REITs through the threat of punishment in the equity
market has likely contributed to increased discipline in the
industry.
—John Thompson
 |
| About the Author
Thompson is an associate
economist in the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. Notes
The author thanks Harvey
Rosenblum, Ira Silver and Tom Siems for insightful
feedback and Kay Champagne for invaluable editorial
help.
- Shareholders still have to pay taxes on dividends
at the individual level.
- National Association of Real Estate Investment
Trusts (2002), "Frequently Asked Questions about
REITs," www.nareit.org
[off-site].
- National Association of Real Estate Investment
Trusts (2002), "The REIT Story," www.nareit.org
[off-site].
- Only two-thirds of REITs trade on major exchanges,
according to NAREIT; others trade on smaller
exchanges. The drop-off in REIT numbers starting
in 1994 is partially attributable to merger
activity.
- Despite strong growth among REITs, the sector's
$172 billion market capitalization amounts to
only 2.1 percent of the S&P 500's $8.2 trillion.
- Elizabeth Stanton (2001), "REITs Rewarding
Investors," Chicago Sun-Times, Aug.
5.
- Rosen Consulting Group, Lend Lease Real Estate
Investments.
- Christine Perez (2001), "September 11 Effect
on Insurance to Benefit REITs," Dallas Business
Journal, Dec. 14, and Samuel Zell (2001),
"Focus on the Economy: This Time It's Different,"
Real Estate Issues, July 1.
- U.S. Census Bureau.
- Shiawee X. Yang (2001), "Is Bigger Better?
A Re-examination of the Scale Economies of REITs,"
Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management,
Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 67–77.
- Perez (2001). The ability of REITs to continue
to capture economies of scale will likely get
better. Average REIT size has trended up in
recent years, and there has been growing pressure
for consolidation. National mergers and acquisitions
in 2001 were almost as numerous as in the previous
three years combined. Some analysts predict
that a third of REITs will disappear or be acquired
before the sector reaches equilibrium. See Robert
Burgess (2001), "Size Lends Weight," Chicago
Sun-Times, May 20.
- Zell (2001).
- Mike Grupe, National Association of Real Estate
Investment Trusts, personal communication.
- Steve Brown (2002), "Report: Area Home Prices
May Fall," Dallas Morning News, April
23.
- An upward adjustment in such premiums would
have likely curbed unjustified lending.
- See Robert A. Eisenbeis, Paul M. Horvitz and
Rebel A. Cole (2002), "Commercial Banks and
Real Estate Lending: The Texas Experience,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics (forthcoming).
See also Bert Ely, "Savings and Loan Crisis,"
The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics,
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/SavingsandLoanCrisis.html
[off-site].
About Southwest
Economy
Southwest Economy
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those of the authors and should not be attributed
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal
Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted
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