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Issue 1, January/February 2002
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
The Federal Budget: What a Difference a
Year Makes
At the beginning of 2001, federal spending
was lower and revenues were higher, relative to GDP, than
in recent experience. The resulting surplus was paying down
the federal debt. Projections indicated that the entire debt
would eventually be retired if tax and spending laws remained
unchanged.
Three major events during 2001 altered
these budgetary patterns. In June, a new tax law brought sweeping
income tax reductions. A recession, induced or deepened by
the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, further reduced revenue and
pushed up spending. The budgetary response to the attacks
also increased spending on defense, homeland security and
recovery. As the policy emphasis shifted from preparing for
long-term needs to meeting current challenges, the budget
moved back into (or close to) deficit.
Budget Policy at the Beginning of
2001
Federal budget results for the
fiscal year ended Sept. 30, 2000, were striking in several
respects. Federal spending came in at 18.4 percent of GDP,
its lowest level since 1966. In recent years, slower medical
cost inflation and defense cutbacks kept spending growth from
matching the rapid pace of GDP growth. In contrast, revenues
reached 20.8 percent of GDP, higher than in any year in U.S.
history except 1944.
Most notably, individual income taxes
were 10.3 percent of GDP, up from 7.6 percent in 1992. Strong
economic growth caused incomes to rise faster than inflation,
pushing taxpayers into higher tax brackets (brackets are adjusted
each year for inflation but not for real growth). High stock
prices helped bring in $118 billion in capital gains taxes,
almost triple the $40 billion in 1995.[1]
The combination of restrained spending
and high revenues yielded a $236 billion surplus, the third
consecutive surplus and the largest in history. During the
three surplus years, the government paid down 10 percent of
its outstanding debt. Fiscal 2000 was the eighth consecutive
year in which budget balance improved (in 1992, the budget
deficit was $290 billion). For the first time in recent history,
the non-Social Security portion of the budget was in surplus,
by $84 billion.
In January 2001, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) foresaw growing surpluses throughout the next
decade if tax and spending laws remained unchanged (Chart
1). This projection marked a dramatic change from the
January 1997 outlook of steadily growing deficits. The 2001
projection showed the entire federal debt being retired in
fiscal 2009.[2]

The 2001 Tax Cut
The first major budgetary
event of 2001 occurred on June 7. Congress and President Bush
adopted the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act (EGTRRA), which provides broad-based individual income
tax relief.[3]
EGTRRA's most striking feature is its
sunset provision, under which the entire law expires at midnight
on Dec. 31, 2010. Unless Congress extends EGTRRA before then,
prior law springs back into force in 2011. A few provisions
expire even earlier, while other provisions phase in slowly,
taking full effect in 2006, 2008 or 2010.
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Provisions.
The law's centerpiece is a reduction
in individual income tax rates (Chart 2). Starting
in 2001, a 10 percent bracket replaces part of the 15 percent
bracket. The 15 percent bracket is lengthened (only for married
couples), a change that phases in from 2005 to 2008. The 28,
31 and 36 percent brackets are each reduced by 3 percentage
points, and the top bracket is lowered from 39.6 percent to
35 percent. Each of these brackets was reduced a half point
in 2001 and is cut another half point for 2002–2003;
an additional full point reduction is set for 2004–2005.
The final reduction will take place at the beginning of 2006.
All brackets return to their initial levels in 2011.
EGTRRA also repeals the estate tax.
It gradually lowers the tax on a $10 million estate from $4.9
million for people dying in 2001 to $2.9 million for those
dying in 2009. It then eliminates the tax entirely for those
dying in 2010. However, the tax is fully reinstated for people
dying in 2011, after the sunset provision takes effect. From
a tax-avoidance perspective, then, any day in 2010 is a good
day to die.
EGTRRA has many other provisions.[4]
It doubles the child credit from $500 to $1,000 by 2010 and
allows some low-income workers who do not owe income tax to
receive part of their credits in cash. The law also expands
a variety of saving and education incentives. For married
couples, EGTRRA provides a larger standard deduction, an expanded
earned income tax credit and higher income phaseout ranges
for some tax breaks. (Confining these provisions and the longer
15 percent bracket to married couples reduces the marriage
penalties that many two-earner couples face and increases
the marriage bonuses that many single-earner couples enjoy.)
EGTRRA eventually repeals the personal exemption phaseout
and the itemized deduction limitation, two provisions that
raise effective marginal rates by 1 to 2 percentage points
for high-income taxpayers.
Some things are not in EGTRRA. It does
not reduce the corporate income tax or payroll and self-employment
taxes. It does not change the special 20 percent tax rate
for long-term capital gains. It trims, but retains, the gift
tax, even when it repeals the estate tax. Unlike many recent
tax laws, it does not include industry-specific or highly
targeted tax breaks. It offers little relief from the individual
alternative minimum tax, thereby increasing the number of
people subject to that tax (see box titled "EGTRRA Doubles
Reach of Alternative Minimum Tax").
EGTRRA
Doubles Reach of Alternative Minimum Tax
The individual alternative
minimum tax (AMT) has lower rates than the regular
income tax but allows fewer deductions and credits.
Taxpayers must pay the AMT if it is higher than
their regular income tax. Congress adopted the
AMT in 1978 to ensure that taxpayers, particularly
those with high incomes, could not use "excessive"
deductions and credits to avoid paying income
tax.
In 2000, the AMT affected
only 1 million taxpayers, causing them to pay
about $9 billion in additional taxes. But because
the AMT (unlike the regular income tax) is not
adjusted for inflation, another 16 million taxpayers,
including some middle-income people, were expected
to move onto it by 2010 under prior law (see chart).
The tax liability was expected to reach $45 billion.
Because the AMT disallows
deductions for dependents and state and local
taxes, people with large families living in high-tax
states are most likely to be subject to the AMT.
Because EGTRRA offers little AMT relief, taxpayers
already slated to be on the AMT receive little
benefit from the law. Also, for many of those
who would otherwise have been on the regular income
tax, EGTRRA will reduce their regular tax liability
below their AMT liability and move them onto the
AMT. By 2010 the AMT rolls will swell to 35 million
(one-third of all taxpayers), including many middle-income
families; the amount of AMT liability will soar
to $133 billion. Of course, Congress may take
measures to forestall the spread of the AMT. |
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Distribution. Although
EGTRRA provides tax savings at all income levels, the largest
savings (in dollar terms) go to high-income taxpayers. Critics
of EGTRRA complain that a large fraction of its tax savings
goes to a small group of high-income taxpayers. Supporters
contend that this group is entitled to a large share of the
tax savings because they make a large share of tax payments.
Chart 3 shows the allocation, across
five income groups, of the number of tax returns, tax payments
before EGTRRA and tax savings from EGTRRA. Although the three
lower-income groups file most of the tax returns, the higher-income
groups pay much of the taxes and receive much of the tax cut.
For example, those with incomes above $200,000 file 2.7 percent
of tax returns, pay 32 percent of taxes and receive 32 percent
of the tax cut. (This group earns 25 percent of all income.)
Those with incomes below $20,000 file 30 percent of all tax
returns, bear 1.6 percent of the tax burden and receive 2.8
percent of the tax cut. (This group earns 4.3 percent of all
income.)

These estimates do not include corporate
income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and self-employment taxes.
Including the estate tax changes would assign a larger share
of the EGTRRA tax savings to high-income groups.
Economic Effects. As
EGTRRA moved toward passage in the spring of 2001, an economic
slowdown was evident. Supporters of EGTRRA argued that it would
promote economic recovery by boosting disposable income, thereby
stimulating consumption. As a fiscal stimulus, EGTRRA achieved
a rare distinction by taking effect before the economy recovered
on its own.
To speed up the stimulus, Congress directed
the Internal Revenue Service to distribute the 2001 savings
from the 10 percent bracket (about $38 billion) in rebate
checks during July through September. Chart 4 shows the upward
spike in disposable personal income in those three months.
(Starting in July, tax withholding was also reduced to reflect
the other 2001 rate cuts.) Congress hoped the rebates would
quickly boost consumer spending. Some economists suggested,
however, that consumers base their spending decisions on their
long-run incomes and therefore would save a one-time income
increase like the rebate.

The chart indicates that consumer spending
did not immediately respond to the rebates. In July and August
(as in May and June), spending remained close to a trend line
fitted to its April 2000–April 2001 growth rate. Consumer
spending plunged in September due to the terrorist attacks,
recovered in October and then slipped again in November.
From a longer-term perspective, EGTRRA
also affects economic incentives. Economists view marginal
rate cuts as an appealing form of tax relief because they
encourage work, entrepreneurship and private saving. The EGTRRA
rate cut benefits the many small businesses that operate as
proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies
and S corporations because these firms are subject to the
individual, rather than the corporate, income tax.[5]
High tax rates also encourage other
forms of tax avoidance, such as tax shelters, fringe benefits,
home ownership and charitable giving. For good or ill, the
rate cut tends to reduce these activities.
Because the effects of tax-rate changes
are difficult to isolate, their size is still disputed. But
the EGTRRA rate cuts are likely to have less impact than the
1964, 1981 and 1986 rate cuts because they are smaller, slower
and made from lower levels. For example, the 1981 law slashed
the top rate from 70 percent to 50 percent five months after
its adoption, while EGTRRA reduces the top rate from 39.6
percent to 35 percent over five years. EGTRRA reverses only
about half of the increase adopted in 1993, when the top rate
rose from 31 percent to 39.6 percent.
Budgetary Impact. According
to official Joint Tax Committee estimates, EGTRRA reduces revenue
by a cumulative total of $1.35 trillion (Chart 5).
The estimates do not reflect changes in work, saving and investment
but do reflect other behavioral responses. The revenue loss
grows as more provisions phase in but tapers off in fiscal 2011
because EGTRRA sunsets three months after the fiscal year begins.
If the law is extended, however, the revenue loss continues
to grow. Interest on the lost revenues (not shown) adds another
$385 billion to the 10-year budget impact.

CBO released new budget projections
in late August 2001. For fiscal 2010, CBO projected a surplus
of $507 billion, down from $796 billion forecast in January
2001. Of the $289 billion revision, $262 billion was due to
EGTRRA ($187 billion revenue loss plus $75 billion interest).
The new projection showed the non-Social
Security portion of the budget temporarily slipping back into
small deficits. For 2010, though, CBO foresaw a $184 billion
surplus outside of Social Security (down from the $484 billion
projected in January). Moreover, the government was still
on track to retire its net debt in fiscal 2012 (three years
later than expected in January).
Two weeks after they were issued, however,
the CBO projections, like so much else, became obsolete. On
Sept. 11, 19 hijackers carried out terrorist attacks that
killed 3,100 people.
Terrorist Attacks and Recession
The attacks further weakened the
economy, ensuring that the slowdown would qualify as a full-fledged
recession, as later confirmed by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.[6] As in any recession, revenues have fallen and
spending on social programs has risen. Along with the federal
government, state governments face revenue shortfalls and
extra spending for unemployment benefits and Medicaid.
Fiscal 2001 ended on Sept. 30 with a
surplus of $127 billion, $26 billion less than CBO had projected
in August. Part of this shortfall reflected extensions firms
received on tax payments and deposits after the attacks. The
non-Social Security part of the budget posted a $36 billion
deficit. Revenues fell to 19.6 percent of GDP from the previous
year's 20.8 percent, while spending held steady at 18.4 percent.
Of course, the attacks had budgetary
implications beyond their damage to the economy. Congress
quickly adopted spending measures to respond to the attacks.
Laws adopted Sept. 18 and Jan. 10, 2002, provide $40 billion
of new spending—$17 billion for national defense and
foreign aid, $10 billion for homeland security and $13 billion
for domestic recovery. A Sept. 22 law gives airlines $5 billion
in grants and authorizes $10 billion in loan guarantees. It
also offers federal compensation to victims of the attacks,
at a cost of $5 billion or more.
After the attacks, Congress began working
on a stimulus package to boost consumption and investment.
Congress considered temporary investment incentives, a supplemental
rebate for households with little or no income tax liability
(these households did not receive the first rebate), tax relief
for firms with losses and those subject to the corporate alternative
minimum tax, a capital gains rate cut, a suspension of payroll
taxes, tax incentives for workers and firms near Ground Zero,
and acceleration of part of the EGTRRA rate cut. On the spending
side, Congress considered extended unemployment benefits,
health insurance assistance for the unemployed and grants
to state Medicaid programs. Most of these measures would have
been temporary.
Due to congressional deadlock, however,
no package was adopted in 2001. While this inaction prompted
some economists to forecast a slower recovery, others argued
that interest-rate cuts by the Federal Reserve were providing
sufficient stimulus and that recovery would soon begin anyway.
These economists noted that a stimulus package might even
be counterproductive if it drove up long-term interest rates.[7]
Congress may consider a stimulus package
again in early 2002. It also may consider partial federal
reimbursement of insurance costs from future terrorist attacks,
another proposal that fell by the wayside during 2001.
CBO released new budget projections
in late January. CBO estimates a $21 billion deficit for fiscal
2002, with a $181 billion deficit in the non-Social Security
portion of the budget. While this $21 billion overall deficit
is a stark contrast to the $313 billion surplus CBO projected
in January 2001, it is also much different from the $188 billion
deficit projected in 1997. Despite recent events, the budget
is in stronger shape than had been expected five years ago
(Chart 6).

CBO foresees the budget returning to
surplus in fiscal 2004. For 2010, it projects a $294 billion
surplus, including a $4 billion non-Social Security surplus.
The surplus becomes larger after EGTRRA expires, allowing
the net federal debt to be retired around 2014. Of course,
new tax and spending measures or economic and foreign policy
developments may affect the budget outlook.
Halting or slowing debt repayment imposes
a higher debt service burden in the future, which will require
tax increases or spending cuts beyond those already required
to address the steep expected increase in Social Security
and Medicare spending (Chart 7). The move away from
debt repayment reflects a shift from preparing for these long-term
needs to meeting the current challenges facing the nation.
Conclusion
A major tax cut, a recession
and the response to the terrorist attacks transformed the federal
budget outlook in 2001. Resources were shifted away from paying
down debt and preparing for long-term needs and toward meeting
current needs, particularly tax relief, economic recovery and
the battle against terrorism.
—Alan D. Viard
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| About the Author
Viard is a senior economist
and policy advisor in the Research Department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
- A 1993 tax law also raised income tax revenue,
although a 1997 tax law reduced it.
- CBO actually projected that the government
would run out of debt to retire in fiscal 2006
because holders of the remaining $1.2 trillion
would be unwilling to sell before maturity.
It would then begin accumulating excess funds.
By 2009, the excess funds would equal the remaining
outstanding debt.
- For a simple description of EGTRRA, see Congressional
Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook:
An Update, August 2001, pp. 5–10.
For a more complete description, see Joint Committee
on Taxation, Summary of Provisions Contained
in the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1836, The
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, JCX-50-01, May 26, 2001.
- The text of EGTRRA runs 113 pages in the United
States Code Congressional and Administrative
News. This is much shorter, though, than
the 316-page text of the 1997 tax reduction
law.
- For new evidence that small business growth
is sensitive to individual income tax rates,
see Robert Carroll, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Mark
Rider and Harvey S. Rosen, "Personal Income
Taxes and the Growth of Small Firms," in
Tax Policy and the Economy, vol. 15
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 121–147.
- The economic effects of the attacks are discussed
by Evan Koenig, "Down but Not Out: The
U.S. Economy after Sept. 11," Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, Issue
6, November/December 2001.
- Economists' reaction is described in Steve
Liesman and Jon E. Hilsenrath, "Many Economists
See No Major Loss in No Stimulus Bill,"
Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2001,
p. A2.
About Southwest
Economy
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