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June 1998
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Houston Branch
Is
There a Slowdown in Houston's Future?
Employment growth in Houston moved into high gear in mid-1996
and has stayed there ever since. The number of wage and salary
jobs rose at a 5.6 percent annual rate in the second half
of 1996, then 4.7 percent from December 1996 to December
1997. Year-to-date job growth through April exceeds same-period
growth in 1997.
A strong national economy combined with a rising oil market
has driven this expansion. The U.S. economy has churned out
more than a quarter- million jobs a month since early 1994,
and the country has enjoyed full employment or better since
1996. The average posted price of crude oil was $20.51 per
barrel in 1996, followed by a healthy $18.61 in 1997. Meanwhile,
natural gas prices rose from $2.16 per thousand cubic feet
to $2.42.
This powerful combination of
national expansion and healthy oil markets easily overcame
an appreciating exchange rate.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas calculates the real trade-weighted
value of the dollar rose 8.1 percent between the last quarter
of 1995 and the end of 1997, in the process eroding Houston’s
large merchandise export sector.
In 1998, the picture has darkened
as energy markets have fallen and the dollar has appreciated
further due to the
financial crisis in Asia. West Texas Intermediate averaged
only $13.87 per barrel in March; natural gas prices have
slid recently, although they remain above $2. The rig count
has slowly fallen from over 1,000 at the end of 1997 to 822
at the last reading. The game for the Houston economy has
suddenly changed from a two-on-one fast break with two strong
economic positives overcoming one negative, and the break
is now headed the other way. The national economy remains
positive, but it can’t offset the dampening effects
of weak oil markets and a strong dollar. With no change in
the current outlook, Houston’s hot economy will cool
off. The question is, how far and how fast.
This article poses three scenarios for this year and next
and estimates the likely growth path of employment under
different assumptions. The scenarios are not forecasts, but
they provide an opportunity to examine how far and how fast
the Houston economy would cool under different circumstances.
Recent growth in Houston has been so strong, and there remains
so much backlog in housing, infrastructure and other areas,
it is hard to imagine job growth of less than 2.5 percent
this year. It will be late 1998 or 1999 before the effects
of weaker energy and a strong dollar are felt in the Houston
job market. But they will be felt, and slower growth probably
lies ahead.
A Mechanical Approach
To estimate the effect of our
three scenarios, we use a simple framework that assumes oil
markets,
the U.S. economy
and the dollar exchange rate drive short-run events in the
local economy. The variables used are the rig count or the
real price of oil, the national unemployment rate, and the
Dallas Fed’s trade-weighted index of the dollar.
It takes four quarters for a change in oil markets or the
U.S. economy to work its way through the Houston economy
and six quarters for a change in the exchange rate to be
completely felt. Table 1 shows the percentage change in employment
in various goods sectors resulting from a 1 percent change
in each factor. The coefficients, which include all immediate
and lagged effects, are based on quarterly observations from
1975 through the first quarter of 1998.
The left side of Table 1 shows
the goods sectors for which estimates were made: all goods
sectors (upstream, downstream
and other manufacturing), upstream oil (mining and machinery),
downstream oil (chemicals and refining) and all other manufacturing.
The signs on these coefficients are mostly as expected—negative
for the unemployment rate and exchange rate, positive for
the rig count and oil prices. The positive coefficient relating
the rig count and the U.S. unemployment rate—indicating
that recessions and good oil markets are often companions—is
different from the relationship for the other sectors but
probably right. Oil markets and the U.S. economy have moved
counter to each other throughout the past 60 years.
In our model, growth in Houston’s
goods production and the U.S. economy drives construction
and all service
sectors. Table 2 shows the effect of a change in goods employment
for the current and four subsequent quarters. The U.S. economy,
included to reflect growth in services driven by factors
outside the area, is significant in wholesale trade and in
transportation, communications and public utilities. It is
also significant for all private services combined. Local
goods production dominates all these sectors, however, and
it strongly leads growth in every service subsector and in
construction.
Longer term structural change
also enters the model, but only through trend and dummy
variables that capture structural
shifts. Thus, we imperfectly capture the effect of new oil
exploration and extraction technology, the consolidation
of the oil industry into Houston, and any local growth independent
of oil market or business-cycle developments. However imperfect,
trend growth of as much as 5 percent a year is included for
machinery industries and 3 percent a year in the “other
manufacturing” category. Also, after 1987 there is
a strong shift upward in the number of oil employees in Houston
(from 3,200 to 5,800) that is independent of changes in the
rig count.
Three Scenarios
In the first scenario Houston continues to
enjoy good times. Scenario 1 assumes the U.S. economy stays
strong, with an
unemployment rate of 4.7 percent through 1999. The rig count
rights itself and returns to 1,000 in the third quarter of
this year and stays there through 1999. Note that this is
a correction in the rig count to previous levels, not a resumption
of growth. Continued job growth in the model is ensured by
bringing the dollar back down from 108 in the trade-weighted
dollar index in first quarter 1998 to 95 by the end of this
year, where it stays through 1999.
Scenario 2 foresees more of the
current situation. As in the first scenario, the U.S. economy
remains strong, but
the dollar also stays at current levels through the end of
1999. Oil markets stabilize at $16–$17 per barrel,
and the rig count holds at 875 working rigs through 1999.
This is the two-on-one fast break described above, with two
negatives now dominating the positives from the U.S. economy.
The situation in Scenario 3 is
bleaker yet. It is a repeat of Scenario 2, but with oil
falling to $13–$14 per
barrel and the rig count dropping to 750 by the end of this
year and staying there through 1999. The dollar and the national
economy remain as strong as they are now.
Table 3 gives the model’s
results for each scenario, expressed in annual growth rates
for employment in 1998 and
1999. Scenario 1, as expected, is a continuation of solid
expansion in Houston. Total employment growth is 3.8 percent
in 1998 and 3.2 percent in 1999. Because the rig count levels
off at 1,000, mining employment flattens. But the decline
in the dollar is enough to revive goods employment, led by
machinery. Services grow at a healthy rate.
Scenarios 2 and 3 manage to maintain overall employment
growth in 1998 at 2.5 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively.
However, in 1999 the reversal in oil and a continued strong
dollar push mining and machinery employment down sharply;
total employment drops 1 percent in Scenario 2 and 2.7 percent
in Scenario 3. Services flatten out in 1999 in Scenario 2
and fall 2.2 percent in Scenario 3.
Conclusion
As previously stated, these scenarios
are not forecasts. Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 are deliberately
chosen
to contrast
with the strong growth of Scenario 1 and to present tough
circumstances for the Houston economy. We don’t know
if oil markets will stay weak and the dollar strong for another
18 months. Nor should the model’s results be taken
literally. As noted above, for example, the model is a clumsy
representation of important structural changes in Houston’s
energy sector—consolidation, restructuring, lower oil
finding costs through technology and so on—that could
provide a significant cushion as oil and natural gas prices
decline.
The ongoing Asian financial crisis
and sloppy oil markets present immediate prospects that
push Houston away from an
outlook like Scenario 1 and closer to Scenario 2. If current
conditions persist, we should not be misled by the local
economy’s current momentum—a significant slowdown
in overall job growth is in the offing, late this year and
in 1999.
Houston Beige Book
May 1998
Rapid job growth and a tight labor market indicate further
expansion in Houston. Job growth this year has been faster
than for the same period in 1997, and the unemployment rate
is at its lowest since 1981. However, continued deterioration
of the oil extraction and chemical industries signals possible
belttightening ahead. Local oil extraction and durable manufacturing
employment have been flat since the beginning of the year.
Oil and Natural Gas Markets
Crude oil markets remain oversupplied,
and storage is full to the brim, with 6 percent more oil
than a year ago. Oil
prices, which rallied to over $16 in April on news of OPEC
and non-OPEC production cuts, recently slipped back under
$15 when only 60 percent of the promised cuts materialized.
Natural gas prices have slowly
fallen over the past six weeks from $2.60 to near $2 per
thousand cubic feet. April
inventories were 25 percent or more above last year’s
levels, in part because of expectations of a hot summer and
possible extraordinary demand by electric utilities.
Drilling activity has continued
to decline and is down about 20 percent from the peak earlier
this year. Oil-related drilling
remains the main culprit in the rig count’s fall, but
softer gas-directed drilling is now emerging. Beige Book
respondents say West Texas and New Mexico are hard hit by
the decline, with reports of numerous stacked rigs.
Refining and Oil Products
Gulf Coast refiners operated at
high levels of capacity utilization in recent weeks, building
inventory for the coming
driving season. This activity plus gasoline imports has resulted
in higher inventories than seen at this time for the past
several years. Wholesale gasoline prices have risen as the
driving season approaches, and refining margins have slowly
improved from last winter’s low levels. Retail gasoline
prices for the Memorial Day holiday were the lowest since
1994. A strong summer driving season is still anticipated,
although gasoline demand for the holiday weekend was weaker
than expected.
Petrochemicals
Weak Asian demand continues to hurt petrochemicals.
Domestic demand remains very strong, but the inability to
export has
put downward price pressure on a number of products. Much
of the olefin and polyolefin chain on the Houston Ship Channel
has seen price declines of a penny per pound or more over
the past month. Further down the product chain, similar price
declines are common for volume purchases of thermoplastics.
Financial Institutions
Banks and other lenders report that
credit quality remains steady, with no increase in delinquency
rates. Commercial
lending continues to be competitive, with many customers
receiving several offers for their business. In consumer
borrowing, mortgage demand is high for both original purchase
and refinancing. Auto financing has slowed seasonally, and
perhaps also in response to low interest rates offered by
automakers as purchase incentives. Texas home equity lending
appears to be evolving as a product marketed largely and
most aggressively by the biggest banks, with less interest
from their small and medium-size counterparts.
Real Estate
Houston real estate generally remains a hot,
hot product, as builders and developers try to catch up with
the torrid
growth of the past two years. Office rental rates and occupancy
are rising. Existing home sales were up 29 percent from April
1997, and inventories were at their lowest since 1982. New
home sales were up 22 percent over last year, and new construction
is being slowed by shortages of labor, concrete and wallboard.
| About Houston
Business
For more information or
copies of this publication, contact Bill Gilmer
at (713) 652-1546 or bill.gilmer@dal.frb.org,
or write to Bill Gilmer, Houston Branch, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 2578, Houston,
Texas 77252. This publication is available on
the Internet at www.dallasfed.org.
The views expressed are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
or the Federal Reserve System. |
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