|
Vol. 2, No. 1
January 2007
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Does Foreign Direct Investment
Help Emerging Economies?
by Anil Kumar
The gap between the world’s
rich and poor countries largely comes down to the financial
and physical assets that create wealth. Developed economies
possess more of this capital than developing ones, and
what they have usually incorporates more advanced technologies.
The implication is clear: A key aspect of economic advancement
lies in poorer nations’ capacity to acquire more
capital and scale the technological ladder. Emerging
economies undertake some capital formation on their
own, but in this era of globalization, they increasingly
rely on foreign capital.
Indeed, total capital flows to
developing economies have skyrocketed from $104 billion
in 1980 to $472 billion in 2005.[1]
The foreign capital has the potential to deliver enormous
benefits to developing nations. Besides helping bridge
the gap between savings and investment in capital-scarce
economies, capital often brings with it modern technology
and encourages development of more mature financial
sectors. Capital flows have proven effective in promoting
growth and productivity in countries that have enough
skilled workers and infrastructure. Some economists
believe capital flows also help discipline governments’
macroeconomic policies (see box titled “Does
Financial Globalization Shape Fiscal Policy?”).
Capital flows come in three primary
forms:
- Portfolio equity investment, which involves buying
company shares, usually through stock markets, without
gaining effective control.
- Portfolio debt investment, which typically covers
bonds and short- and long-term borrowing from banks
and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank.
- Foreign direct investment (FDI), which involves
forging long-term relationships with enterprises in
foreign countries.
FDI can be made in several ways.
First, and most likely, it may involve parent enterprises
injecting equity capital by purchasing shares in foreign
affiliates. Second, it may take the form of reinvesting
the affiliate’s earnings. Third, it may entail
short- or long-term lending between parents and affiliates.
To be categorized as a multinational enterprise for
inclusion in FDI data, the parent must hold a minimum
equity stake of 10 percent in the affiliate.
Establishing foreign affiliates
usually entails starting new production facilities—so-called
greenfield investments—or acquiring control of
existing entities through cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
Recent years have seen a marked shift toward international
mergers and acquisitions.
In developing nations, equity
investments as a percentage of gross national income
have been flat in recent years. Debt flows, however,
have picked up since 2002 after plunging to zero in
the previous two years. Meanwhile, FDI as a share of
GDP has grown rapidly, becoming the largest source of
capital moving from developed nations to developing
ones (Chart 1).

From 1990 to 2005, developing
economies’ share of total FDI inflows rose from
18 percent to 36 percent. In addition, the geographical
composition of FDI flows has changed dramatically over
the past four decades. Within developing economies,
Latin America’s share of FDI has fallen from 52
percent in the 1970s to 33 percent since the 1990s.
Asia’s share of inflows has risen from 25 percent
to 60 percent during the same period.
Within Asia, China and India have
gained FDI share relative to Southeast Asia. Today,
these two emerging economic giants are the most attractive
markets for FDI. China’s FDI shot up from $3.5
billion in 1990 to $60 billion in 2004, while India’s
rose from a paltry $236 million to $5.3 billion. The
shift reflects the two nations’ more open economic
policies, as well as their sheer size and dynamic growth.
The rush to invest in places like
China and India suggests that FDI will continue to be
an increasingly important source of development finance.
To better understand these capital inflows and their
ripples, we need to examine their effect on key aspects
of the receiving countries’ economic performance—stability,
trade, savings, investment and growth.
FDI’s Stability
For emerging economies, FDI
has significant advantages over equity and debt capital
flows. Foreign firms’ participation in domestic
business encourages the transfer of advanced technologies
to the host country, and it fosters human capital development
by providing employee training. It also strengthens
corporate institutions by exposing host countries to
developed economies’ best business practices and
corporate governance.
From a macroeconomic perspective,
FDI is more stable than other types of capital flows
(Chart 2). Equity and short-term debt in particular
tend to be highly volatile and speculative, and their
role in igniting and deepening financial crises in the
1990s has been closely scrutinized.[2]
FDI’s relative stability and long-term character
make it the preferred source of foreign capital for
many emerging economies. In fact, FDI has been so stable
in tumultuous times that some economists have called
it “good cholesterol” for emerging economies.[3]

The declining volatility of foreign
capital flows has paid off in higher economic growth.
With FDI’s share of developing nations’
foreign investment rising, host countries have experienced
less overall volatility in investment flows, as measured
by their deviation from average rates of incoming capital.
Comparing total capital flows with mean real GDP growth
rates for emerging economies, we find that higher volatility
coincided with lower economic performance from 1970
to 2004 (Chart 3).

FDI and Trade
Many developing countries
pursue FDI as a tool for export promotion, rather than
production for the domestic economy. Typically, foreign
investors build plants in nations where they can produce
goods for export at lower costs. Another way FDI helps
boost exports is through preferential access to markets
in the parent enterprise’s home country.
Multinational enterprises, the
creatures of FDI, play a dominant role in world trade,
accounting for two-thirds of all cross-border sales.[4]
Foreign affiliates were responsible for more than half
China’s exports in 2001 and 21 percent of Brazil’s.
They accounted for just 3 percent of India’s.
At the country’s current rate of economic liberalization,
however, foreign companies are likely to increase their
share of India’s exports.
FDI can also provide a path for
emerging economies to export the products developed
economies usually sell—in effect, increasing their
export sophistication.[5] A new study
by Dani Rodrik puts the export sophistication of China,
a leading FDI recipient, at least three times higher
than that of countries with similar per capita GDP.
India, another FDI hot spot, also did well on this score.[6]
Some emerging economies are fast becoming attractive
destinations for multinationals’ research and
development centers, suggesting further gains for developing
nations.
FDI is an important channel for
delivery of services across borders—for emerging
economies as well as developed ones. Services aren’t
as widely traded as goods, making up only a fifth of
world exports. That figure is expected to rise rapidly,
however, as the Internet and other communications make
more services tradable and facilitate the spread of
outsourcing. In fact, FDI has grown faster in services
than in goods in recent years.[7]
In most developing nations, service
industries have been closed to foreign investment. As
countries further open their economies, services can
be expected to continue outpacing goods. The pattern
of services FDI has also been changing. In 1990, finance
cornered 57 percent of services FDI in developing economies.
By 2002, its share had fallen to 22 percent as business
services’ share rose from 5 percent to 40 percent.
As services become increasingly
tradable, FDI in these industries can forge a strong
link with exports of emerging economies. Multinationals
operating in such services as banking, telecommunications
and trade enhance the efficiency of homegrown providers
in myriad ways, contributing to the export competitiveness
of these economies’ service sectors. With both
FDI and trade rising rapidly in services, FDI has an
important role in promoting the sector’s globalization
in other emerging economies.
FDI, Savings and Investment
Foreign investment can ripple
through receiving economies in many ways. It can finance
current account deficits through its effect on investment
or offset other financial transactions, such as increases
in reserves or capital outflows. The imported capital
may simply result in additional consumption rather than
investment. In principle, it needn’t always boost
the country’s productive capital stock. If foreign
and homegrown companies vie for the same investment
pie in the host country, FDI may simply offset, or crowd
out, domestic investment.
Of course, FDI may represent a
net capital gain or even “crowd in” domestic
investment through a number of channels, such as transfers
of technology and key expertise that doesn’t exist
in host countries. India, for example, has opened up
parts of its retail sector to foreign investment, although
it limits outsiders to a maximum 49 percent stake. FDI
is likely to spur domestic investment in India’s
retail sector as existing players partner with such
foreign giants as Wal-Mart to open stores.
We can test for crowding out by
determining how a percentage point increase in the ratio
of FDI inflows to GDP impacts domestic investment as
a share of GDP. Using data from the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund and other sources for 19 emerging economies,
our model indicates the domestic investment rate rises
in the first year following the FDI increase, with positive
effects continuing beyond the second year (Chart
4).[8] The 95 percent confidence
bands, with upper and lower bounds, suggest the positive
response could be as short as a year but may continue
as long as two. The cumulative effect of an increase
in FDI on domestic investment is positive in the long
run.[9]

Of course, this doesn’t
account for the full range of capital inflows. Equity
and debt investments may differ from FDI in the direction
and magnitude of their impacts on investment. Because
it’s more stable, FDI is likely to have a larger
impact on domestic investment than equity flows do.
Some forms of debt, particularly long-term borrowing
from multilateral institutions like the World Bank,
may be highly beneficial for domestic investment if
used to fund extremely productive infrastructure projects
in emerging economies. To compare the impact of FDI
and other capital flows, we need to account for all
three types of incoming foreign investment.
Our model indicates that FDI has
a significant effect on both investment and savings
(Chart 5). A percentage point rise in the ratio
of FDI to GDP leads to an increase of a half percentage
point in domestic investment and three-fourths percentage
point in domestic savings. The results suggest that
FDI actually crowds in domestic investment and delivers
a positive impact on savings. While FDI has strong positive
effects on savings and investment, it has a small positive
effect on the current account—the difference between
domestic savings and investment.[10]

In our model, FDI performs better
than other types of foreign investment. Equity inflows
show no discernible effect on investment or savings,
possibly because they’re considerably more volatile
than FDI and may represent largely speculative investment
in financial markets. Debt, on the other hand, has a
strong positive effect on investment, an indeterminate
effect on savings and a significant negative impact
on the current account.
The data support the notion that
FDI should be the preferred form of foreign investment.
It makes a net addition to developing nations’
productive resources, without causing deterioration
to the current account. This suggests FDI will bolster
the receiving country’s overall economic performance.
The question is whether FDI’s desirable effects
on savings and investment produce tangible effects on
developing nations’ growth.
FDI and Growth
Despite FDI’s potential
to boost technology, productivity, investment and savings,
economists have—somewhat surprisingly—struggled
to find a strong causal link to economic growth. Some
studies have detected a positive impact, but only if
the country has a threshold level of human capital.[11]
This seems to confirm FDI’s important role in
propelling growth in China and India, which have vast,
untapped technical workforces. China graduates 600,000
engineers every year; India produces 215,000.[12]
A stumbling block to identifying
FDI’s impact on growth lies in the fact that these
investments can be the cause as well as the result of
economic vitality because foreign capital beats a path
to the world’s hottest developing-market economies.
Other problems make it difficult
to disentangle FDI’s effect on GDP growth. For
countries with high tariff and nontariff barriers, FDI
may simply be the result of multinational corporations
trying to access domestic markets because the export
route has been closed. In this case, FDI may contribute
to economic growth, but the impact will be reduced to
the extent high tariffs stunt growth.
Countries also woo foreign investors
with tax breaks and subsidies. Fiscal incentives are
doubtlessly a good way to promote FDI. After all, tax
havens are prominent FDI recipients. However, researchers
have found that such policies aren’t effective
ways to reap FDI’s economic benefits. Indeed,
the policies may create distortions that significantly
blunt FDI’s efficiency and productivity gains.
Tax incentives may prove wasteful because FDI responds
more to such factors as labor market flexibility, the
cost of doing business and the quality of the infrastructure.
As we did with domestic investment,
we can examine how a percentage point increase in the
FDI-to-GDP ratio affects emerging economies’ performance
(Chart 6). Although FDI doesn’t boost
growth immediately, it delivers positive effects in
the year after FDI increases. This suggests a significant
link between FDI and GDP growth, one that develops over
time because investment spending increases the nation’s
productive capacity. Although the growth effect dies
down, the cumulative effect on output is still positive
in the long run. The confidence bands indicate that
the positive growth effect in the year following FDI
inflow is statistically significant.

In addition to spurring growth,
FDI may have wage and productivity spillovers in the
host country. If multinationals pay more than domestic
firms, it may force the latter to raise wages. If foreign
investors transfer technology to domestic firms, FDI
would also help make workers more efficient.
Is FDI Always Good?
FDI offers attractive benefits
that include technology, investments, savings and growth.
But emerging economies should exercise caution.
Counter to economic intuition,
FDI may flow to riskier destinations. We can see that
by plotting FDI’s share of a country’s total
capital inflows against that nation’s composite
risk rating for developing and emerging countries in
December 2003 (Chart 7). The risk measure is
obtained from the UNCTAD FDI Inward Potential Index
database, which uses higher numbers to indicate lower
risk.

The downward-sloping line indicates
that FDI tends to make up a greater share of capital
inflow in places investors might otherwise avoid. Most
likely, such countries pay a premium for FDI through
tax breaks and other incentives.
The relative advantages of FDI
during crises are well documented. However, capital
flight can’t be ruled out. In times of extreme
financial crisis, FDI may be accompanied by distress
sales of domestic assets, which could be harmful.[13]
Even in normal times, FDI can be reversed or diminished
through domestic borrowing by affiliates of multinational
corporations and repatriation of funds.
Too much FDI may not be beneficial.
Through ownership and control of domestic companies,
foreign firms learn more about the host country’s
productivity, and they could overinvest, at the expense
of domestic producers. [14] There
is a possibility that the most solid firms will be financed
through FDI, leaving domestic investors stuck with low-productivity
firms. Such “adverse selection” isn’t
the best economic outcome.
Despite these pitfalls, FDI appears
to help emerging economies develop. It complements the
host country’s institutions and human capital.
In many countries, however, barriers to FDI remain.
These barriers may range from limits on foreign ownership
and control to outright bans on FDI in select sectors,
such as services. Reducing them may well be a way to
speed up economic development. FDI benefits investors,
to be sure, but it also pays dividends to the countries
that attract it.
 |
| About
the Author
Kumar is an economist
in the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
- These numbers are calculated
using data from the World Bank’s
Global Development Finance Online database
and are not adjusted for inflation.
- For more on this, see
the following publications: “International
Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention,
and Cures,” by Lawrence H. Summers,
American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings, vol. 90, May 2000, pp.
1–16; “Aspects of Global Economic
Integration: Outlook for the Future,”
by Martin Feldstein, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper no. 7899,
September 2000; and “The Capital
Myth: The Difference Between Trade in
Widgets and Dollars,” by Jagdish
N. Bhagwati, Foreign Affairs,
vol. 77, May/June 1998, pp. 7–12.
- “Foreign Direct
Investment: Good Cholesterol?” by
Ricardo Hausmann and Eduardo Fernandez-Arias,
Inter-American Development Bank, Research
Department Working Paper no. 417, March
2000.
- World Investment
Report 2002, United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
- “What You Export
Matters,” by Ricardo Hausmann, Jason
Hwang and Dani Rodrik, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Working Paper no.
11905, December 2005.
- “What’s
So Special About China’s Exports?”
by Dani Rodrik, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper no. 11947, January
2006.
- World Investment
Report 2004, UNCTAD.
- Unless noted otherwise,
this article uses data from the International
Monetary Fund’s International Finance
Statistics; “The External Wealth
of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended
Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities,
1970–2004,” by P. Lane and
G. M. Milesi- Ferretti, International
Monetary Fund, Working Paper no. 06/69,
March 2006; and World Development Indicators
Online database, 1970–2004. The
sample of emerging economies consists
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.
- Estimation was carried
out using panel VAR techniques. See “Financial
Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior:
Evidence from Panel Vector Autoregression,”
by Inessa Love and Lea Zicchino, The World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series
no. 2913, 2002.
- These results confirm
the findings in “Capital Flows to
Developing Economies: Implications for
Saving and Investment,” by Barry
P. Bosworth and Susan M. Collins,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
no. 1, 1999, pp. 143–69.
- “How Does Foreign
Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?”
by E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio and
J-W. Lee, Journal of International
Economics, vol. 45, June 1998, pp.
115–35.
- The number of engineers
is based on a 2005 study by Duke University
researchers Gary Gereffi, Vivek Wadhwa
and others. Note that these numbers include
engineers with associate degrees and diplomas
and are not adjusted for quality, thus
not directly comparable with figures for
the U.S.
- For a discussion of
the implications of such distress sales,
see “Fire-Sale FDI,” by Paul
Krugman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
February 20–21, 1998, http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/FIRESALE.htm.
- “Excessive FDI
Flows Under Asymmetric Information,”
by Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka and Chi-Wa
Yuen, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper no. 7400, October 1999.
|
 |
|
| Does Financial
Globalization Shape Fiscal Policy?
Reckless macroeconomic
polices that include large fiscal deficits
and excessive borrowing can trigger a vicious
cycle of speculative capital outflows and
higher interest rates, with dire consequences
for a developing economy.[1]
Facing a crisis of confidence, governments
may raise interest rates to keep foreign
investors from leaving, and higher borrowing
costs may tip the economy into recession.
Because policymakers
would want to avoid that outcome, fear of
large-scale reversals of international capital
flows could have a disciplining effect.
Governments may, for example, seek to lessen
the risk of capital flight by curbing fiscal
deficits.[2] If we look
at financial globalization, as measured
by the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities
to GDP, we see that it seems to coincide
with rising fiscal deficits in 19 emerging
economies over 15 years from 1990 to 2004
(Chart A).

The correlation, however,
could be misleading if it doesn’t
account for country-specific factors that
may be associated with both capital inflows
and budget deficits—for example, inflation
and economic growth. Moreover, the relationship
would look exactly the same if budget deficits
were driving financial globalization.
If we account for
these factors, we find a negative correlation
between financial globalization and the
fiscal deficit (Chart B). Although
the list of other factors isn’t exhaustive,
the data suggest that financial globalization
through larger capital flows helps discipline
fiscal policies in host countries.

Notes
- For more on financial
globalization and fiscal policy, see “The
Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?”
by Maurice Obsfeld, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 12, Fall 1998,
pp. 9–30, and “Does Financial
Globalization Induce Better Macroeconomic
Policies?” by Irina Tytell and Shang-Jin
Wei, International Monetary Fund, Working
Paper no. 04/84, May 2004.
- Globalization may also
help shape monetary policy with consequences
for inflation. For a discussion, see “Openness
and Inflation,” by Mark A. Wynne
and Erasmus K. Kersting, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas Staff Papers,
forthcoming.

|
|
| Economic
Letter is published monthly by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views
expressed are those of the authors and should
not be attributed to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted
on the condition that the source is credited
and a copy is provided to the Research Department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Economic Letter
is available free of charge by writing the
Public Affairs Department, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 655906, Dallas,
TX 75265- 5906; by fax at 214-922-5268;
or by telephone at 214- 922-5254. This publication
is available on the Dallas Fed web site,
www.dallasfed.org. |
|
|