|
Vol. 1, No. 10
October 2006
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Laying the Foundation for a Mortgage
Industry in Mexico
by Edward C. Skelton
Well-developed financial markets
are indispensable to modern economies. It’s hard
to imagine the United States and other major economic
powers without the web of financial products and instruments
that connects savers and borrowers, promoting investment
and efficiency. Countries with underdeveloped and ineffective
financial markets face significant barriers to growth
and competitiveness. Indeed, higher levels of financial
service availability are generally associated with lower
rates of poverty because credit creation facilitates
development (Chart 1).[1]

Given the importance of well-functioning
financial markets, surprisingly little attention has
been paid to Mexico’s recent progress in laying
the foundation for a world-class financial system. A
series of quiet reforms—many enacted in just the
past few years—points to a financial big bang
in the making.
A prominent example is securitization,
which some consider financial innovation at its best.
By pooling previously illiquid assets and selling their
future income streams to investors, securitization unlocks
value and promotes a free flow of capital, spreads risk
and boosts credit availability for consumers and businesses.
Mexico issued its first mortgage-backed security—for
$178 million—in December 2003. Since then, the
market has expanded to approximately $1.5 billion a
year, a total expected to double over the next year,
then double again in 2008.
This rapidly growing market for
mortgage-backed securities is a prime example of Mexico’s
success in financial development. Not long ago, financing
for home purchases was scarce, and obtaining it typically
required a down payment of 50 percent or more for a
relatively costly adjustable-rate loan. Today, a rapidly
growing number of people have access to competitively
priced, fixed-rate mortgages.
The development of a mortgage
industry should boost Mexico’s economy by encouraging
higher quality housing, increased savings and greater
wealth creation (see the box
“The Payoff from Mortgage-Backed Securities”).
At the same time, making it easier to buy and sell homes
will promote household mobility, a key factor in freeing
labor resources to move from slow-growing to more dynamic
parts of the country.
Reforms Supporting the Mortgage
Market
Recent loan growth at Mexican
banks has been robust in the three major categories
(Chart 2).[2] Consumer lending
has risen dramatically for the past six years, albeit
from a low base. Commercial lending, largely nonexistent
since 1994, resumed growing in 2004, a movement expected
to accelerate. Most remarkable, however, is the surge
in home mortgage lending that began in 2005. The upturn
reflects a continuing trend in Mexico’s home mortgage
industry: explosive growth in the total number of mortgages
originated by bank and nonbank lenders since 1999 (Chart
3).


Compared with the previous high-growth
environment of the early 1990s, today’s lending
risk is much better contained and monitored. The improvement
results from advances in accounting rules, capital adequacy
measures, loan classification requirements, and auditing
and risk management procedures—all of which now
meet or exceed international standards. Mortgage lending
has seen major structural improvement within each of
the lending processes’ critical dimensions: gauging
creditworthiness, backing loans and obtaining funds.
Gauging creditworthiness.
Mexico has made strides in
collecting more and better information about borrowers’
creditworthiness. Technological improvements and the
development of reliable credit bureaus have contributed
to better management information systems and speedier
loan decisions. As a result, the cost of underwriting
and originating home mortgages has declined.
In January 2002, Mexico introduced
a revised legal framework for governing credit bureau
operations. This law, coupled with supporting bank regulation,
improved the timeliness of credit bureau data on the
creditworthiness of potential borrowers, increased lenders’
use of credit bureau information and strengthened privacy
protections.[3] Partly because of the
new law, the depth and quality of borrower information
in Mexico now compare favorably with that of both regional
peers and developed countries.
El Buró de Crédito,
Mexico’s most prominent credit bureau, was the
only market participant until Círculo de Crédito’s
establishment in June 2005. Data from these two privately
owned organizations is extensive, covering almost 40
million individuals and 1.6 million companies, or an
estimated 70 percent of potential borrowers. Such penetration
is remarkable, given that the credit bureaus themselves
have only a 10-year history. Just as in the United States,
households and businesses are entitled to one free credit
report a year.
Backing loans. Even
with abundant information on borrowers, full repayment
of a loan, particularly a long-term mortgage, is seldom
assured. For this reason, credit assurances are usually
sought to reduce the expected loss should default occur.
One such assurance involves the
mortgage itself. The home—generally an appreciating
asset—serves as collateral, helping ease concerns
regarding default, enhancing the availability of credit
and cutting its cost.
Mexico has made important advances
to enable the use of houses as collateral. In 2000,
bankruptcy reform improved contract enforcement and
creditor rights by clarifying and streamlining the process
and strengthening lenders’ ability to repossess
assets. The collateral provisions were further strengthened
in 2003.
Generally consistent bankruptcy
rules now apply across the country, whereas previously
they varied considerably from one jurisdiction to another.
Moreover, the reform established an extrajudicial mechanism
for collateral repossession and bankruptcy resolution,
alleviating the need for lenders to access a judicial
system that at local and state levels remains inefficient
and inconsistent in applying law and precedent. With
homes serving more securely as collateral, lenders can
extend mortgages with greater confidence.
Additional security for mortgages
has come from the establishment of mortgage insurance,
which offers creditors protection, within limits, if
the underlying collateral doesn’t cover a loan’s
unpaid balance. A government agency has offered mortgage
insurance since July 2005. A reform this past March
allows the private sector to provide it as well.
The availability of mortgage insurance
opens the market to more people and promotes the supply
of credit by lowering interest rates and down payments.
In addition, it provides an important credit enhancement
for Mexico’s growing mortgage-backed securities
market. Lastly, insurance makes borrowers with the highest
loan-to-value ratios share the cost of servicing relatively
risky loans.
Obtaining funds. Once
adequate protections for lenders are in place, the mortgage
market still requires the obvious: funds to lend. Mexico
has enhanced the flow of money into home mortgage lending
through securitization. The development of this market
allows mortgage originators to remove loans from their
books, freeing funds for new loans.
Securitization can also lower
lenders’ cost of funds. In deciding how to raise
money, lenders may choose between issuing debt based
on their own promise to repay or issuing securities
supported by the future income of specific loan packages.
Obtaining funds through securitization often means less
expensive financing than would be possible based on
the lender’s own credit rating.
Mexico’s first mortgage-backed
securities were issued in December 2003, following years
of improvements to the associated information systems.
Other structural changes supporting securitization include
uniform underwriting standards, consistent loan valuation
standards and transparent foreclosure rules. As a result
of these efforts, Mexico’s mortgage-backed securities
market now compares favorably with those of similar
countries (Table 1).
| Table 1 |
| Top 10 Emerging-Market Mortgage-Backed
Security Issuers |
| Rank |
|
Deal value
(millions of U.S. $) |
Number
of deals |
1 |
|
South Korea |
$9,850.40
|
|
21 |
|
2 |
|
Mexico |
1,732.10 |
|
27 |
|
3 |
|
Malaysia |
1,087.50 |
|
2 |
|
4 |
|
South Africa |
988.4 |
|
4 |
|
5 |
|
Taiwan |
729.5 |
|
5 |
|
6 |
|
China |
362.3 |
|
1 |
|
7 |
|
Chile |
51.1 |
|
2 |
|
8 |
|
Czech Republic |
27.5 |
|
2 |
|
9 |
|
Latvia |
15 |
|
1 |
|
10 |
|
Argentina |
13.3 |
|
1 |
|
|
NOTE: Data are for June 2004–June
2006.
SOURCE: Dealogic. |
The appetite for such securitized
products is large, especially among Mexican institutional
investors. Because of reforms liberalizing the industry,
Mexico’s pension funds have experienced explosive
growth. Fund managers should continue to be eager buyers
of mortgage-backed securities, which boast investment-grade
ratings, as they continue to diversify away from government
bonds.
However, foreign institutional
investors have been mostly absent from the market, with
the exception of some U.S. hedge funds. For now, the
small size of Mexico’s issuances relative to those
in developed countries precludes widespread international
interest in the securities. Problems with accurately
forecasting cash flows are another limiting factor.
Mexico’s lack of historical data increases the
difficulty of forecasting prepayment speeds, delinquencies
and defaults. Such longer-run data will become available
over time.
Building a Mortgage Industry
While structural reform of
the financial markets has supported the component parts
of mortgage lending, Mexico has been fostering the institutions
that support homebuying.
The government runs the country’s
two largest mortgage lenders— Instituto del Fondo
Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores (Infonavit)
and Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal (SHF).
The federal government established
Infonavit in 1972 as an autonomous agency to manage
a workers housing fund and promote their housing rights.
Infonavit finances mortgages for workers via a mandatory
5 percent payroll deduction that also helps fund other
social programs. The agency held loans totaling $40.1
billion on June 30, the largest mortgage portfolio in
Latin America.
Infonavit issued its first mortgage-backed
security in 2004, with $68.2 million in 12-year bonds.
The agency followed with a series of 20-year bonds backed
by low-income mortgage portfolios, all purchased by
Mexican institutional investors interested in long-term
securities with stable, investment-grade ratings.
Payments on loans backing Infonavit’s
securities come via automatic deductions from workers’
wages, which helps hold down delinquencies. The delinquency
rate for Infonavit’s initial issuance has hovered
around 2 percent, consistent with the conservative loan
origination standards needed to meet institutional investors’
investment-grade demands.
SHF was created in 2001 to spur
development of the secondary mortgage market by guaranteeing
credits and creating a central database on borrowers,
loans and mortgage-backed securitizations. The agency
held $8.8 billion in directly funded home loans at year-end
2005.
Through partial guarantees, SHF
has assumed a significant amount of the credit risk
in securitized mortgage pools, lowering issuers’
transaction costs and reducing the credit enhancements
needed to meet a particular rating standard. The Mexican
government, in turn, has explicitly guaranteed SHF’s
obligations through 2009.
In addition to originating mortgages,
SHF has been a major funding source for Mexico’s
mortgage finance companies, known by their Spanish acronym,
sofoles. Overall, 35 percent of sofoles’
direct funding comes from government sources.
Although Infonavit and SHF have
been the most active in Mexico’s securitization
market and maintain a dominant presence in mortgages,
their market share has declined, even as the industry
has grown (Chart 4). In terms of value, public
institutions originated more than 90 percent of Mexico’s
mortgages in 2002, with Infonavit responsible for two-thirds
of the total. By June 2006, the government lenders accounted
for 63 percent of the value of new mortgage loans.

The government’s lost market
share has largely gone to sofoles and banks.
A comparison of their mortgage origination growth with
that of Infonavit and SHF shows the private-sector institutions
gaining significantly on the government programs.
This trend will likely continue.
SHF is phasing out mortgage originations and sofoles
funding and plans to cease both operations by 2009.
To help sofoles adjust, SHF will continue to
provide partial mortgage guarantees, maintaining considerable
credit enhancement and fostering mortgage securitization.
To qualify for guarantees, mortgages must meet specific
requirements for property type and value, as well as
standards for debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios.
Such standardization in the underwriting process promotes
homogeneity, another characteristic that facilitates
securitization. In addition to the partial guarantees,
SHF will be more active in the mortgage insurance market.
Mexico’s Housing Boom
When he took office in December
2000, President Vicente Fox promised that by the end
of his term in 2006, the number of houses built annually
would rise from 250,000 to 750,000. Analysts expect
construction of roughly 800,000 units in 2006, up from
600,000 in 2005. All told, Mexico will have built more
than 3 million houses from 2001 through 2006.
Despite this, Mexico still has
a deficit of 5 million units, largely due to lackluster
housing stock growth in the 1980s and ’90s. Because
of the pent-up demand, housing construction in Mexico
will probably continue at a fast pace, with as many
as 1 million homes built in each of the next few years.
Several factors are contributing
to the strong demand. Official records put Mexico’s
homeownership rate near 90 percent, but that number
is somewhat misleading. More than 60 percent of the
homes were self-constructed, and quality is often substandard,
prompting many residents to look for new places to live.
Demographic trends are also driving
demand. In 2000, Mexicans ages 20 to 49 totaled 31 million.
This population is expected to grow to 46 million by
2020, pulling housing demand up along with it.
At the same time, Mexico’s
middle class is expanding. Currently, those in the lower-middle
and middle classes—households making $4,100 to
$11,000 a year—account for 45 percent of the population,
up 25 percentage points since the start of 2001. For
the past decade, wages have risen faster than inflation,
providing gains elusive in the crisis-prone years of
1975–95. In addition, birthrates have declined
and more women are working. All these factors boost
the ability to buy a house.
Regions with high labor demand
are experiencing acute housing shortages, while many
homes are located in areas of limited economic opportunity.
Mexican businesses often fill jobs with workers from
relatively distant locations. Given the lack of nearby
housing, groups of workers often reside in a single
apartment.
While many of these workers are
homeowners, their houses may be hundreds of miles from
where they work and live. They presumably would prefer
to sell their distant homes and buy new ones closer
to work—were the homes available. What’s
more, other family members could relocate to faster
growing regions, with their better job opportunities.
Finally, the cost of home financing has dropped dramatically.
Ten years of economic stability, declining inflation,
financial market reform and banking-sector competition
have greatly enhanced lenders’ ability to offer
longer-term loans at reasonable rates.
In September 2006, banks were
offering fixed-rate, 20-year mortgages at roughly 9
percent, with a required down payment of 10 percent.
Just two years earlier, the same mortgage would have
carried an interest rate of 18 percent and required
a 35 percent down payment.
Toward Modern Financial Markets
Mexico’s step-by-step
creation of the institutional infrastructure for mortgage
lending illustrates how many interconnecting parts are
needed for just one segment of a modern financial system.
While improving mortgage finance, Mexico has adopted
other financial sector reforms. Since 1998, for example,
the country has established a more formal infrastructure
for trading derivatives—financial instruments
whose value is tied to the performance of interest rates,
currency values, stocks or other assets (see
the box “Derivatives in Mexico”).
Mexico has also bolstered confidence
in corporate finance. As recently as 1998, the country
issued no corporate bonds, and lending to the private
sector had fallen to less than half its 1994 level.
Now Mexican companies acquire financing of more than
$10 billion annually from bonds, and bank lending is
advancing rapidly.
Mexico implemented corporate governance
standards for securities-rating agencies in January
2006. The new rules include an industry code of conduct
and stronger measures to ensure the confidentiality
of financial data and other sensitive information. These
reforms bring the country in line with international
standards, increase investor confidence in agencies’
opinions and recommendations, and boost bonds’
marketability.
Legislation passed this year is
facilitating the development of a market for real estate
investment trusts (REITs), promising greater access
to funds for the real estate sector overall.[4]
The legislation changed tax laws, with the goal of stimulating
real estate investment by enhancing liquidity and diversification
opportunities, while opening the real estate market
to small investors. The first Mexican REIT was issued
in March 2006.
The creation of modern financial
markets will have wide-ranging effects on the economy.
By freeing up funds, reducing borrowing costs and deepening
the financial system, Mexico’s emerging mortgage-lending
industry is already helping boost both the quantity
and quality of the housing stock.
A possible longer-term benefit
involves the country’s still large informal economy,
in which individuals and businesses operate outside
official regulations. Monthly incomes as low as $420
qualify formal-sector households—which pay taxes—for
government-originated loans (Chart 5).

The opportunity to obtain mortgage
financing may represent a substantial incentive to report
personal income and pay social security taxes. Over
time, such a process could lead to a more inclusive
formal economy in Mexico, coinciding with a continuing
rise in the middle class.
The rapidly expanding home mortgage
market could enhance Mexico’s economic well-being
in many other ways. The homestead is the primary savings
vehicle for most Mexican families. With financing scarce
in the past, the only way for many to save was one brick
at a time, with the construction of their home spread
over many years. Today, with greater access to mortgage
credit, a growing number of households have the option
of purchasing a completed house and paying for it over
time—a process offering better shelter while allowing
for the gradual accumulation of equity.
The flip side of enabling more
people to purchase fully constructed homes is that those
wishing to sell them should find that easier, too. This
could reduce the tendency for people to find themselves
tethered to a region by the untappable wealth accumulated
in their home.
While families have often circumvented
this problem by sending a breadwinner to live wherever
work could be found, the ability to relocate families
to regions offering better jobs may enable more Mexicans
to improve themselves financially. By creating a more
liquid housing market, the country’s expanding
mortgage market may reduce labor market rigidities as
well, contributing to a more dynamic Mexican economy.
The
Payoff from Mortgage-Backed Securities
In addition to freeing
up funds, reducing borrowing costs and deepening
financial system penetration into the housing
sector, securitization promises other benefits
for Mexico.
Investment opportunities.
Aside from government
paper, Mexico has few options for attractive,
fixed-income products. As a result, pension
funds, insurance companies, money managers
and other institutional investors have limited
ability to diversify their portfolios. Currently,
private pension funds hold more than 80
percent of their assets in government debt.
Given these funds’
growth rates and lack of diversification,
mortgage-backed securities—whose underlying
assets often carry a government guarantee
or mortgage insurance—should be particularly
attractive. Perhaps more important, mortgage-backed
securities typically carry an investment
grade, an important distinction in Mexico’s
market for private debt.
Macro-level risk
diversification. By
isolating risk and repackaging it for investors,
securitization helps redirect financial
risk to those more able to bear it. Spreading
risk helps make the financial system as
a whole more stable.
Micro-level risk
diversification. The
availability of a wider range of financial
assets enhances institutional investors’
ability to create stable, diversified asset
portfolios, especially when issuers can
meet specific investors’ needs by
varying the risk characteristics of mortgage-backed
securities. A pool of mortgages, for example,
can be grouped by risk, so a subordinate
issue absorbs any losses before a senior
interest is affected. The subordinated debt
holders agree to greater loss exposure in
exchange for a higher return.
Specialization.
Securitization
can enhance the financial system’s
specialization. As securitization markets
develop, specialized companies typically
compete to service financial institutions’
loan portfolios. Institutions then have
the option of outsourcing their own portfolio
supervision, collection and customer service
operations. In the United States, data suggest
this specialization improves loan portfolio
performance. |
|
Derivatives
in Mexico
Another important,
yet unsung, development in Mexico is the
growth of a vigorous financial derivatives
exchange.
Before the 1998 creation
of MexDer, the country’s organized
exchange for derivatives contracts, Mexico
had about 100 years’ experience with
unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives.
These mostly consisted of mature foreign
exchange and interest rate derivatives.
MexDer activity was
anemic before 2001, when ongoing government
efforts to develop a full yield curve for
peso-denominated debt finally began to bear
fruit. Since then, MexDer has experienced
strong growth in interest rate futures and
foreign exchange swaps. By 2004, MexDer
had become the fifth most active futures
exchange worldwide and the third most active
for short-term interest rate futures.
In 2004, the exchange
expanded its equity-related business by
initiating trade in stock options, stock
futures and index options. Mexico’s
relatively small equity market has yet to
spawn much growth in these types of derivatives.
Still, the impressive development of Mexico’s
derivatives market overall offers another
example of the type of quiet reforms that
are creating a world-class financial system. |
|
 |
| About
the Author
Skelton is an international
financial analyst in the Financial Industry
Studies Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
Notes
- For more on financial
development’s role in economic growth,
see Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists:
Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets
to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity,
by Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales,
New York: Crown Business, 2003, and “Finance
and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right,”
by Robert G. King and Ross Levine, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 108, August
1993, pp. 717–37.
- For more on Mexico’s
booming credit market, see
“Mexico Emerges from 10-Year Credit
Slump,” by Robert V. Bubel and
Edward C. Skelton, Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas Southwest Economy,
May/June 2005, pp. 14–18.
- This law gave rise to
the banking regulation seemingly most
responsible for the increased use of credit
bureau information. This regulation required
a 100 percent capital reserve for loans
made without consulting credit bureau
information. The regulation was subsequently
reformed so that credit extended to borrowers
with a negative credit history would also
require the 100 percent reserve coverage.
Moreover, creditors are required to update
information on their borrowers every month.
- A REIT, which often
is publicly traded, holds the titles to
real estate property and mortgages for
the benefit of a large group of investors.
A REIT is exempt from corporate income
taxes as long as nearly all its income
is distributed to the trust’s investors.
|
|
| Economic
Letter is published monthly by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views
expressed are those of the authors and should
not be attributed to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted
on the condition that the source is credited
and a copy is provided to the Research Department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Economic Letter
is available free of charge by writing the
Public Affairs Department, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 655906, Dallas,
TX 75265- 5906; by fax at 214-922-5268;
or by telephone at 214-922-5254. This publication
is available on the Dallas Fed web site,
www.dallasfed.org. |
|
|