

El Paso Business Frontier



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS EL PASO BRANCH ISSUE 3 • 2004

U.S.–Mexico Trade: Are We Still Connected?

Trade between the United States and Mexico slowed sharply between 2001 and 2003, primarily because of slower growth in both countries. During this period, gross domestic product (GDP) growth fell to 1.6 percent per year on average in the United States and 0.6 percent in Mexico. Consequently, U.S. exports to Mexico fell 4.4 percent on average per year for 2001–03. U.S. imports of goods and services from Mexico grew only 0.6 percent on average per year over the same period.

Currently, with both countries again growing strongly, U.S.–Mexico trade seems to be back on track, rising at an annual rate of 13.5 percent since January. This article looks at how trade between the United States and Mexico has increased synchronization of the two economies, examines both countries' trade by industry and explores how enhanced trade between these countries affects border economic growth.

INSIDE:

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ECONOMIC SYNCHRONIZATION THROUGH TRADE

Inter-industry trade refers to countries exporting and importing the products of different industries based on comparative advantage provided by their national characteristics or initial endowments. This is the standard concept of trade taught in every elementary economics textbook, describing how opening trade between two countries unequivocally enhances the welfare of both.

Three important results follow from this theory of inter-industry trade. First, after trade opens, a country will export goods that are relatively intensive in abundant domestic factors. The United States will export technology because of its relative abundance of skilled labor or wheat because of its farmland. It will import goods like textiles or apparel that are intensive in scarce, low-wage labor. Second, trade benefits the

abundant factors (skilled labor, farmers) and hurts the scarce factor (low-wage labor). The country as a whole gains, but there are well-defined losers. Third, export industries expand while industries competing with imports contract, perhaps causing extensive unemployment and long-term readjustment.

There is another form of trade, however, that is not based on the competition between scarce and abundant factors. *Intra*-industry trade occurs within industries and even between countries making the same good and using similar factors of production.¹ This trade can arise because goods are similar but not identical—Japanese car manufacturers are known for quality, U.S. automakers for innovations like the minivan and sport utility vehicle. Opening intra-industry trade can spread fixed cost across countries as one or the other develops a cost advantage. Unlike inter-industry trade, where there are well-defined and broad classes of winners and losers, intra-industry trade does not carry implications of massive readjustment across industries. Innovations can arise anywhere, and the location of fixed factors may simply be an accident of history.²

Although opening trade implies new linkages between countries, there is no consensus about whether increased trade leads to more or less correlation of business cycles across trading partners. However, recent empirical research suggests that if the integration of trading-partner economies is the result of growing intra-industry versus inter-industry trade, business cycles will become more positively correlated.³ The experience of the European Union and other economically integrated regions shows that the structural-adjustment processes induced by trade liberalization are less disruptive if the adjustment follows intra- rather than inter-industry patterns.⁴

Maquiladora-led U.S.–Mexico trade is primarily intra-industry trade. Most industries experienced large increases in intra-industry trade over the first five years of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).⁵ From 1993 to 2003, U.S.–Mexico total trade increased 189 percent, from \$81.4 billion to \$235.5 billion. About 80 percent of U.S. trade with Mexico is intra-industry, a fact that may have played a role in the countries' increased economic synchronization, especially after NAFTA took effect in 1994 (*Chart 1*). From 1980 to 1993, the correlation coefficient between the coincident indexes of economic activity in the United States and Mexico was 0.73. The same correlation coefficient increased to 0.96 between 1993 and 2004. More formal studies by Mexico's central bank provide evidence that production linkages between Mexico and the U.S. manufacturing sectors strengthened after NAFTA's enactment, and as a consequence, business cycles in these countries became more synchronized.⁶


WHAT ARE MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES TRADING?

Table 1 lists the 15 largest U.S. exports to Mexico plus the top 15 U.S. imports from Mexico in 2003. Eleven categories appear on both lists, indicating extensive intra-industry trade. Computer and electronic products, for example, were the top U.S. export to Mexico and also the second-largest import from Mexico. Transportation equipment was the second largest U.S. export to Mexico but also the top U.S. import from Mexico. This two-way exchange implies each country is sending the other the same product, just at different stages of production. In the computer and electronic products category, the United States may send Mexico chips and software, while Mexico sends assembled computers back to the United States—an example of U.S.–Mexico trade through the maquiladora industry.

Originally, maquiladora plants were allowed to temporarily import duty-free supplies, parts, machinery and equipment necessary to produce goods and services in Mexico, as long as the output was exported back to the United States. The United States, in turn, taxed only the value-added portion of the manufactured product. The top three maquiladora sectors—transportation equipment, electronics, and textiles and apparel—together compose 75 percent of total maquiladora employment and are well represented in our list of 15 leading goods traded between the two countries.

Table 2 shows U.S. exports to Mexico for the 10 leading exporting states in 2003. Texas is the most important exporter to Mexico, with almost 43 percent of the total (\$41.6 billion), followed by

Chart 1
U.S. and Mexico Get Synchronized
(Coincident indexes of economic activity)



SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Table 1
U.S. Trade with Mexico, 2003
(Billions of U.S. dollars)

Exports				Imports			
Rank	NAICS code	Product	Amount	Rank	NAICS code	Product	Amount
1	334	Computer and electronic products	21.533	1	336	Transportation equipment	35.458
2	336	Transportation equipment	12.356	2	334	Computer and electronic products	29.557
3	325	Chemicals	9.175	3	211	Oil and gas	14.439
4	333	Machinery, except electrical	8.511	4	335	Electrical equipment, appliances, and component	10.997
5	335	Electrical equipment, appliances, and component	6.184	5	315	Apparel and accessories	7.177
6	326	Plastics and rubber products	4.826	6	333	Machinery, except electrical	5.642
7	311	Food manufacturing	4.165	7	332	Fabricated metal products, NESOI	3.710
8	332	Fabricated metal products, NESOI	4.041	8	339	Miscellaneous manufactured commodities	3.567
9	111	Agricultural products	3.586	9	111	Agricultural products	2.972
10	331	Primary metal manufacturing	2.854	10	325	Chemicals	2.370
11	313	Textiles and fabrics	2.718	11	331	Primary metal manufacturing	2.342
12	322	Paper	2.701	12	312	Beverages and tobacco products	1.747
13	324	Petroleum and coal products	2.323	13	316	Leather and allied products	1.721
14	339	Miscellaneous manufactured commodities	2.269	14	327	Nonmetallic mineral products	1.673
15	315	Apparel and accessories	1.656	15	311	Food manufacturing	1.394
		Subtotal:	88.898			Subtotal:	124.766
		All other:	8.559			All other:	13.306
		Total	97.457			Total	138.072

SOURCE: U.S. International Trade Commission.

California at 15 percent (\$14.9 billion) and Michigan with 4.1 percent (\$4 billion). Texas' leading exports are computer and electronic products, transportation equipment and chemicals. California exports computer and electronic products, machinery, and plastics and rubber products, while Michigan mainly exports transportation equipment, computer and electronic products, and chemicals.

TRADE AT THE BORDER

In 2003, trade through land ports along the U.S.–Mexico border represented about 83 percent of the trade between the countries. Together, the top 10 ports of entry account for 98 percent of trade passing through the border (*Table 3*). Laredo was by far the leader with a 40.5 percent share, or \$79 billion in cargoes. Second-place El Paso had about half the exports of Laredo, at \$40 billion, or 20.2 percent. With \$152 billion in land trade with Mexico, Texas surpassed other states by far: California (\$30 billion), Arizona (\$12 billion) and New Mexico (\$1.1 billion). Growth in U.S.–Mexico trade in the 1990s, as well as the increased economic interdependence along the border, is easily explained by the stellar performance of the maquiladora industry during the decade. For instance, Mexico's total maquiladora trade reached \$136 billion in 2003, or about 41 percent of the country's total trade. This figure was up fivefold from 1990, when it was only \$24 billion.

The positive impact of maquiladora growth for the U.S. side of the border has two main sources: (1) the spillovers from maquiladora-associated income growth in neighboring Mexican cities, such as retail sales, and (2) the shift of many U.S. maquiladora suppliers to border cities from their traditional base in the Midwest.⁷ In recent years, we have seen how rising real wages in Mexico and foreign competition have reduced the prospects for maquiladora growth in some sectors, and now we are seeing foreign competition make inroads into the maquiladora supply chain. This raises the possibility of slowing, or even

Table 2
U.S. Exports to Mexico by Top 10 States, 2003
(Billions of U.S. dollars)

State	Total exports
All United States	97.457
1 Texas	41.561
2 California	14.872
3 Michigan	4.006
4 Arizona	3.229
5 Illinois	2.153
6 Indiana	2.105
7 Ohio	2.102
8 Florida	1.814
9 Louisiana	1.776
10 New York	1.705

SOURCE: World Institute for Strategic Economic Research.

reversing, the growth of U.S. border-city suppliers to the maquiladora industry.

Throughout the 1990s, the vast majority of imported inputs to the maquiladora industry came from the United States. In 2000, 90 percent of maquiladora inputs were from the United States and 9 percent were from Asia, with China contributing only 1 percent (*Chart 2*). By 2003, 69 percent came from the United States and 28 percent from Asia, including 8 percent from China. The United States remains the majority supplier, but this rapidly moving trend continued to run in favor of Asia into 2004.

It may be that U.S.-based suppliers are simply being replaced by global competitors, mainly from Asia. Alternatively, perhaps U.S.-based suppliers are having their inputs partially or completely produced in Asia to take advantage of cheaper labor, then sent to Mexico for final assembly in the maquiladoras. Either way, maquiladora imports from the United States have fallen, even though Mexico's maquiladora exports remain almost completely (98 percent) destined for U.S. consumption.

Unfortunately, data are not available on exactly which inputs are being displaced, making it difficult to assess the impact on Texas border communities. Did production move to the border in the 1990s because the inputs being produced were time-sensitive, making it hard for Asian firms to compete? Or are Texas suppliers, like more distant suppliers in the Midwest, seeing a rapid production shift to Asia?

Recent research suggests it is still too early to write off the established supplier networks on the border, in spite of rising wages in Mexico. Competitive advantages continue in sectors that place a premium on proximity to both markets and sup-

Table 3
U.S.–Mexico Trade by Top 10 Land Ports, 2003
(Billions of U.S. dollars)

City	Total trade
1 Laredo, TX	78.812
2 El Paso, TX	39.334
3 Otay Mesa–San Ysidro, CA	19.747
4 Hidalgo, TX	14.432
5 Nogales, AZ	10.356
6 Brownsville–Cameron, TX	10.147
7 Calexico, CA	8.898
8 Eagle Pass, TX	5.739
9 Del Rio, TX	2.772
10 Santa Teresa, NM	1.089
Total for 10 ports of entry	191.326

SOURCE: Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development, Texas A&M International University.

plier networks.⁸ More specifically, the established competitive supplier networks of the border maquiladoras, and the developed border infrastructure that links the maquiladoras to the large U.S. market, can offset the initial disadvantages of higher labor costs and a leveling of tariff policies. With a continued strong presence of cross-border interdependence, the border region can remain the pioneer and leader with respect to manufacturing processes.

SUMMARY


U.S.–Mexico trade is growing again at rates experienced before the recent economic slowdown. In addition, the top products traded by these countries have not changed, implying that trade expansion may have a less disruptive effect in both countries as a result of the intra-industry nature of their trade relationship. This relationship may also be a key factor in the economic synchronization of the U.S. and Mexican business cycles. Recent data suggest that U.S. suppliers to the Mexican maquiladora industry are rapidly being replaced by global competitors, mainly from Asia. Data are not available to specifically assess this trend's impact on Texas suppliers, but research suggests that proximity and infrastructure remain significant assets for maquiladora suppliers located in Texas border cities.

—Jesus Cañas
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(continued on back page)

Chart 2
U.S. Suppliers Losing Market Share in Mexico



NOTES: 2004 data are for January through April; Asia excludes China.
SOURCES: Banco de México; authors' calculations.

Why Is El Paso's Job Market So Sluggish?

Over the past eight quarters, the U.S. economy has nearly equaled its performance during the best years of the 1990s tech boom, with average gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3.7 percent. However, between the last peak in economic activity in March 2001 and September 2004, the U.S. economy added barely a quarter million new wage and salary jobs, a number that would have been typical of one month's job growth in the late 1990s.

Every indication is that El Paso's economy is following the national lead. The El Paso index of coincident economic activity is up 2.6 percent over the past 12 months, and the city finds itself surrounded by rapid growth. For the last 12 months of data available, U.S. industrial production is up 5.1 percent, Mexican GDP is up 4.4 percent, Mexican industrial production has risen 5.5 percent, and there are 7.7 percent more maquiladora jobs. But with all this good news, local employment has expanded only 1.1 percent over the past year.

This article focuses on job growth in the United States and El Paso.¹ It is about the reasons for slow growth, the various ways we measure employment and the different stories these measures tell right now. The month after month of bad news on job growth has been primarily delivered by the establishment survey of wage and salary employees, while other measures indicate faster growth. Could these other measures mean that El Paso and the cities of the Desert Southwest are really doing better than we think?

WHERE IS THE JOB GROWTH?

How could U.S. job growth come to a virtual standstill for the past two years in the midst of strong expansion in output? The answer seems to be a surge in productivity growth, best explained by a simple identity between output (O), employment (E) and productivity, or output per worker (O/E):

$$O = E \times (O/E)$$

In terms of growth rates, this becomes additive:

Growth rate of output = growth rate of employment + growth rate of productivity.

Over the past eight quarters, U.S. GDP growth has averaged 3.7 percent, and productivity has surged at a 4.1 percent annual rate. A little arithmetic indicates this leaves room for job growth of -0.4 percent.

To most economists, a surge in productivity is hardly a bad thing. In the short run it may be a job killer, but at the same time it lowers the cost of production, allowing for some combination of higher producer profits, higher employee wages and lower consumer prices. All of these argue for an eventual strengthening of demand for product and workers, following on the heels of stronger investment and consumption. In other words, while productivity kills jobs in the short run, it should generate many more jobs in the long run.

Explanations of why we have waited so long for the long-term gains to arrive vary: Round after round of uncertainty, from 9/11 to accounting scandals to Iraq, has postponed investment; structural change is only slowly moving workers out of declining industries; or the tight and overheated 1990s labor market may have overshot equilibrium and is just now adjusting back to normal. Whatever the reason, we have lived with the short-run, job-killing features of productivity for over two years, waiting for the long-term benefits to arrive.

El Paso should not be immune to these gains in productivity. Its economy remains closely tied to manufacturing, a sector that has led the U.S. economy in productivity gains over the past 25 years, and the competitive pressures of the global economy dictate that you adopt the best technology or close your doors. As indicated above, just as in the rest of the United States, there is every indication that El Paso is experiencing rapid production growth accompanied by a sluggish job market.

ESTABLISHMENT VERSUS HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT MEASURES

Controversy has recently surrounded two alternative measures of employment level (and, hence, job growth) produced each month by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).² The two surveys are produced for different reasons and measure different concepts, but comparisons between the two are inevitable. Comparisons are all the more likely to be drawn in a political season when one is indicating significant job growth and the other is not. Table 1 shows job growth between the March 2001 economic peak and September of this year. The more widely watched and cited establishment survey indicates little growth, while the household survey points to significantly more jobs—a difference of 1.7 million in the United

Table 1**Job Growth in El Paso and Other Metropolitan Areas in the Desert Southwest According to Two Measures of Employment, March 2001–September 2004**

	Household	Establishment
El Paso	16,420	2,200
Albuquerque	6,709	10,200
Las Cruces	7,018	5,900
Lubbock	4,481	-200
Midland–Odessa	10,082	3,800
San Angelo	2,944	700
New Mexico	46,272	43,500
Texas	529,226	-64,000
Texas Triangle Cities	184,751	-109,800
United States	1,986,000	249,000

NOTES: Based on 1999 MSA definitions. Texas Triangle metros are Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston and San Antonio.

SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; author's calculations.

States, almost a half million in Texas and more than 14,000 in El Paso. Albuquerque is the only exception to faster growth in the household survey, but overall there is no question that the two series seem to have a different story to tell, especially in Texas.

If the comparisons in Table 1 point to higher growth in the household survey, surely there should be some story about a dark corner of the job market captured by the household measure but neglected by the establishment survey—new business formation, multiple-job holders or proprietorships, for example. Unfortunately, the more you try to pin down the differences between these series, the less sure you can be of how to interpret them.

The Current Employment Statistics survey, or establishment survey, is based on administrative records kept for the national unemployment insurance program. It provides a monthly estimate of the number of private sector and government employees covered by unemployment insurance, based on a monthly sample of over 400,000 work sites and about one-third of all nonfarm workers. Annually, accurate totals of the number of nonfarm wage and salary workers can be obtained from administrative records, ensuring that recent sample values can be corrected to actual values and continuing sample values are linked to a solid anchor in the recent past.

The Current Population Survey, or household survey, is based on a monthly sample of 60,000 households interviewed in person or by telephone. The universe measured here is much broader than wage and salary jobs; it includes all civilian noninstitutional population age 16 and over. Unlike the establishment survey, it counts the self-employed (proprietors and partners), agricultural workers, unpaid family members and

workers absent from the job without pay. There is no direct way to benchmark the survey to administrative totals, but annual re-estimates are produced along with new population estimates.

Perhaps one place to look for a discrepancy is the broader coverage of the household sector. More than a million agricultural workers and 9 million self-employed are not in the establishment survey. Or perhaps methodological differences hold the answer. The household survey counts workers based only on their primary em-

ployment, while the establishment survey counts the number of jobs, allowing multiple-job holding. Unfortunately, a careful accounting of these differences doesn't seem to take us far.

This is not the first time these two series have diverged for a long period. Between 1994 and 2000, the two series moved apart by more than 5.3 million in terms of indicated job growth, but in opposite directions from today, with the establishment survey indicating faster growth. Sophisticated efforts to resolve this 1990s difference are not encouraging. After all the definitional and coverage differences discussed above were considered (along with a number of others), only 21.5 percent of the difference in estimated growth could be accounted for.³

Referring back to Table 1, the current controversy over job growth may be a proverbial rabbit trail. As much as the alternative household employment data seem to better correspond to the strong growth around us, there are no firm methodological grounds to explain it. The last two times these surveys diverged widely (although in opposite directions), the data currently in hand would allow us to explain only 21 percent of the gap in growth. There is no reason to think it is different now, and we are simply left with an unsatisfying statistical mystery.

PROPRIETORS AND PARTNERSHIPS

The side-by-side comparison of the household and employment survey yielded one clue that something interesting might be happening outside the scope of the nonfarm wage and salary survey since March 2001—the addition of 434,000 proprietors in the household survey by September of this year. The Census Bureau defines a proprietor as a person who works for profit or fees in his

or her own unincorporated business, profession or trade, or who operates a farm. To learn about proprietors at the local level, the best place to look is the Regional Economic Information System (REIS), produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). It is not comparable to the two employment surveys examined already, in that it is designed to provide data on employment and income in great geographic detail, is only produced annually (not monthly), and the latest year's data are only made available with a lag of about 18 months.

The REIS employment data appear in two series: a wage and salary series and another series on the number of proprietors, divided into both farm and nonfarm proprietors. Construction of the wage and salary data in REIS begins with the BLS establishment data, but BEA then adds a number of wage and salary jobs not covered by the unemployment insurance program, such as students and their spouses employed by colleges and universities, nonprofit organizations that choose not to participate, elected officials, members of the state and local judiciary, and so on.

The result is a BEA series that shifts up in level—in 2002, BEA added about 5.4 percent more wage and salary workers to the U.S. establishment data, 5.5 percent more in Texas and 8.4 percent more in El Paso—but does not otherwise alter its statistical characteristics.

The proprietor data in REIS are unique, however. They are not based on a sample but are taken from income tax filings with the Internal Revenue Service.⁴ To be consistent with the wage and salary data, the BEA counts jobs (not workers) and allows multiple-job holding. Recall that the household survey counts only workers and the BLS counts only proprietors whose *primary*

job is running their own business. The difference in the count is striking once part-time entrepreneurship is allowed: In the United States in 2002, there were 8.9 million proprietors and partners in the household survey and 29.6 million in the BEA count. The BEA counted 2.4 million proprietors in Texas in 2002 and 49,000 in El Paso. Obviously, part-time ownership of a business is common; examples are barber and beauty shops, childcare providers, real estate agents, carpenters, plumbers and tax preparers.

Did the number of proprietors matter over the course of the business cycle's latest turns? The long lag in the delivery of the data lets us see only the first year of recovery. Table 2 shows the percent change in 2001–02 in the total number of jobs, wage and salary jobs, and number of proprietors. Note that in the United States, Texas and all the cities examined, proprietors account for at least 15 percent of all jobs. Changes in the number of wage and salary jobs are quite close to the story told by the BLS establishment data in every area, and (with the exception of Las Cruces) percent changes in the number of proprietors are quite large, in contrast to the growth of wage and salary numbers. Adding proprietors into the total job count improves the job growth estimates in 2001–02 by a half to a full percentage point in most areas.

Are these good jobs? Or are they just a Band-Aid following recession? Certainly, some people may turn to their own business in difficult economic times if they feel threatened in their primary employment or if a slowdown brings less overtime. If laid off, some professionals may simply print business cards and become instant consultants. Others may find themselves pushed by circumstances into starting a business they have long

Table 2
Growth of Total Employment, Wage and Salary Jobs, and Proprietorships, First Year of Recovery, 2001–02

	Proprietors (Percent share)	Percent job growth, 2001–02		
		Total	Wage and salary	Proprietors
El Paso	15	1.7	1.1	5.2
Albuquerque	15.6	.8	-.01	5.5
Las Cruces	16.2	3.6	3.5	4.3
Lubbock	18.9	.1	-.8	4.3
Midland–Odessa	23.2	-.1	-1.1	3.4
San Angelo	21.1	.2	.5	5.2
New Mexico	18.3	1.8	1.2	4.6
Texas Triangle	17.4	-.2	-1.4	5.4
Texas	19.4	.2	-.8	4.7
United States	17.7	.1	-.9	5.5

NOTES: Based on 1999 MSA definitions. Texas Triangle metros are Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston and San Antonio.

SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; author's calculations.

considered. And others may find new opportunity in the general economic housecleaning that a recession brings. One study found that the oil bust in Texas and Louisiana cities led to a quick surge in the number of proprietors, but that it took several years for a large increase in proprietors' income to follow.⁵ Recessions are also sometimes compared to forest fires, leaving the seeds of economic regeneration on the forest floor after they pass. These proprietorships may well be the seeds of future growth.

CONCLUSION

Despite the controversy at the national level over which employment series to follow, we could find little evidence that the more optimistic, less watched household series really offers trustworthy news about additional job growth in El Paso and surrounding cities. The exception is perhaps in new proprietorships, where the self-employed added from 0.5 percent to 1 percent to total employment in the first year of economic recovery.

Even if this proprietor job growth carried over into 2003 and 2004, adding a percentage point to growth in El Paso or Texas or the United States, the numbers remain disappointing. The primary factors still shaping job growth at present are the short-run, job-depressing effects of productivity, along with some structural readjustments to the 1990s tech boom and bust. We are still waiting for the long-term, job-growing benefits of higher productivity growth that seem sure to follow.

—Robert W. Gilmer

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NOTES

- ¹ The December 2004 issue of *Houston Business*, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, contains a similar but more detailed analysis of the same problem for Houston and other Texas Triangle cities.
- ² For a summary of the controversy, including a number of issues not touched on in this article, see "Employment from the BLS household and payroll surveys: summary of recent trends," on the BLS web site at www.bls.gov/cps/ces_cps_trends.pdf.
- ³ "Examining the Discrepancy in Employment Growth Between the CPS and CES," by Mary Bowler, Katie Kirkland, Jurgen Kropf, Thomas Nardone and Signe Wetrogan, a paper prepared for the Federal Economics Statistics Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C., October 17, 2003.
- ⁴ The total number of proprietors is taken from Schedule C of IRS Form 1040 on gains and losses from business, and a partnership count from Form 1065, U.S. Partners Return of Income. Limited partnerships for oil and gas and real estate are handled separately.
- ⁵ See "Finding New Ways to Grow: Recovery in the Oil Patch," by R. W. Gilmer, *Houston Business*, July 1996.

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NOTES

- ¹ The seminal work on this subject is *Intra-Industry Trade: The Theory and Measurement of International Trade in Differentiated Products*, by H. G. Grubel and P. J. Lloyd, New York: John Wiley, 1975.
- ² For an introduction to the subject, see "The Nature and Significance of Intra-Industry Trade," by Roy J. Ruffin, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas *Economic and Financial Review*, Fourth Quarter 1999, pp. 2–9.
- ³ "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria," by Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, *Economic Journal*, vol. 108, July 1998, pp. 1009–25.
- ⁴ "Intra-Industry Trade: Current Perspectives and Unresolved Issues," by David Greenaway and Chris Milner, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, vol. 123, no. 1, 1987, pp. 39–57.
- ⁵ "Intra-Industry Trade Between the United States and Mexico: 1993–1998," by Don P. Clark, Thomas M. Fullerton Jr. and Duane Burdorf, *Estudios Económicos*, El Colegio de México, vol. 16, no. 2, 2001, pp. 167–83.
- ⁶ See "Bilateral Trade and Business Cycle Synchronization: Evidence from Mexico and United States Manufacturing Industries," by Daniel Chiquiar and Manuel Ramos-Francia, Working Paper no. 2004-05, Dirección General de Investigación Económica, Banco de México, October 2004. Also see "La Relación de Largo Plazo del PIB Mexicano y de sus Componentes con la Actividad Económica en los Estados Unidos y con el Tipo de Cambio Real," by Daniel G. Garcés Díaz, Documento de Investigación no. 2003-4, Dirección General de Investigación Económica, Banco de México, marzo de 2003.
- ⁷ See "El empleo en la frontera de Texas y el crecimiento de las maquiladoras," by Jesus Cañas, Roberto Coronado and Robert W. Gilmer, *Acontecimientos Recientes sobre Desarrollo Económico Fronterizo*, Colegio de la Frontera Norte, forthcoming.
- ⁸ See "Maquila Sunrise or Sunset? Evolutions of Regional Production Advantages," by Stephan Weiler and Becky Zerlentes, *Social Science Journal*, vol. 40, no. 2, 2003, pp. 283–97.



El Paso
Business Frontier
ISSUE 3 • 2004

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