

# Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Economies

by

SEBASTIAN EDWARDS

University of California, Los Angeles

and

National Bureau of Economic Research

March, 2000

# Six Assertions

- The “middle ground,” in terms of exchange rate regimes, is *dead*
- There are “good fixes” and “bad fixes”; there are “good flexes” and “bad flexes”
- “Dollarization” makes sense for some countries, but not for all
- A “common currency area” for the Americas is unlikely to happen any time soon
- Some countries should Dollarize unilaterally
- For most (but not all) countries, a “good flex” maybe easier to achieve than a “good fix”

# Good and Bad Fixes

## ■ A “good fix”:

- Solves credibility problems
- “Forces” policy makers and politicians to act in a fiscally responsible fashion
- Results in macroeconomic stability
- Coexists with a flexible economic structure; thus, shocks are accommodated without “excessive” unemployment
- Solves the “lender of last resort” problem in an efficient way

## ■ A “bad fix” does not achieve any of the above

- In general, credibility problems are pervasive and costly

# Good and Bad Flexes

- Under a “good flex”:
  - The nominal exchange rate is the main (but not the only) shock absorber
  - The Central Bank abstains, under most circumstances, from selling or buying international reserves
  - There is an increased monetary policy independence
  - Coexists with fiscal austerity, and results in low inflation
  - Coexists with strong banks
- A “bad flex” does not achieve any of the above
  - It is a peg in disguise


# Latin American blues:

- We don't have “good fixes”, yet...
  - Argentina is not a good fix
  - Neither is Panama
- We don't have “good flexes”, yet...
  - Mexico has not been a very good flex
- In Latin America, fixes and flexes have been affected by two historical problems:
  - Pro cyclical capital flows
  - Pro cyclical fiscal policy


# How Stable has Argentina Really Been?

- It has been compared with Mexico
- But Mexico has been affected by major crisis; may not be the right comparison
- Chile is another possible benchmark for comparison


# Crises and Domestic Interest Rates: Argentina and Chile




# Interest Rate Response to a Shock to Latin American Risk: Argentina and Chile



# Interest Rate Response to a Shock to Non-Latin American Risk: Argentina and Chile



# Exchange Rate and Interest Rates: Three Phases in Mexico's History




## ■ Correlation coefficient

A. 96/1 - 97/10 **-0.63**

B. 96/11 - 98/7 **0.06**

C. 98/8 - 99/10 **0.77**

# Interest Rate Volatility in Argentina and Mexico



# How to Accommodate Changes in Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates ?

